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indicates that pre-development land tax should lead to faster development but a side-effect of 
this is that the density of development may be affected too. According to empirical results, a 
higher pre-development land tax increases single family housing starts but does not affect 
development density measured as the volume (cubic meters) per started unit. Chapter 3 analyzes 
the costs and benefits of rent control to tenants. The focus is on the measurement of welfare 
losses from misallocation of housing under rent control. Empirical results suggest that the costs 
of increased mismatch between dwellings and households under rent control offset much of the 
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allowance system. Theoretical analysis shows that the system creates incentives to move to 
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Tiivistelmä: Tämä väitöskirja koostuu asuntomarkkinoiden taloustieteellistä analyysia 
esittelevästä johdantoluvusta ja kolmesta tutkimuksesta, joissa analysoidaan 
asuntomarkkinoihin vaikuttavia politiikkatoimenpiteitä. Luvussa 2 tutkitaan kiinteistöverojen 
vaikutusta asuntorakentamiseen. Teoreettisen mallin mukaan rakentamattoman tontin korotettu 
kiinteistövero nopeuttaa maanomistajan rakentamispäätöstä, mutta saattaa vaikuttaa myös 
rakennustehokkuuteen. Empiiristen tulosten mukaan rakentamattoman tontin korkeampi 
kiinteistövero tosiaan lisää omakotialoitusten määrää, mutta kuutiometreinä mitattu 
rakennustehokkuus aloitusta kohden ei näytä muuttuvan. Luvussa 3 tutkitaan vuokrasääntelyn 
hyvinvointi-vaikutuksia vuokralaisten näkökulmasta. Tutkimuksessa keskitytään 
vuokrasääntelytilanteesta johtuvan asuntojen virheallokaation aiheuttaman hyvinvointitappion 
mittaamiseen. Empiiristen tulosten mukaan vuokrasääntely lisäsi eroja halutun ja todellisen 
asumiskulutuksen välillä, mistä aiheutuvat hyvinvointitappiot kumosivat osan matalien vuokrien 
hyödyistä vuokralaisille. Luvussa 4 tutkitaan Suomen asumistukijärjestelmän 
kannustinvaikutuksia. Teoreettisen analyysin mukaan asumistuki kannustaa valitsemaan tietyn 
pinta-ala–laatu kombinaation omaavia asuntoja. Empiiristen tulosten mukaan tukeen oikeutetut 
kotitaloudet eivät vaikuta reagoivan kannusteisiin. 
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11 Introduction 
Housing markets provide an important and challenging theme for economic and 
econometric research. Understanding the functioning of housing markets, and the 
effects of government policies targeted at housing markets, is highly important for 
various reasons. Firstly, housing is a necessity which satisfies a basic need - the need for 
shelter. Secondly, the economic significance of the housing sector is huge, because 
housing is the single most important component of households’ consumption 
expenditure and their financial portfolios. Thus, housing markets are an important sector 
for national economies, and housing markets can even cause turmoil in the world 
economy, as witnessed by the recent credit crisis triggered by subprime mortgage 
instruments. Thirdly, government involvement in the housing market is broad and deep. 
In most countries, housing markets are affected by numerous taxes, subsidies and 
various forms of regulation at different levels of government. The effect of these 
policies on the functioning of the housing market and on the budgets of national and 
local governments is significant. Ensuring that housing policies have the intended 
effects requires research.  
Research on housing markets and on the housing market effects of government policies 
is challenging since housing has a unique set of characteristics, which in many cases 
mean that standard neoclassical models are inadequate. The recognition of the special 
properties of housing has contributed to the emergence of housing economics as a 
branch of economic literature. The purpose of this study is to contribute to this literature 
by analyzing the effects of some of the housing policies applied in Finland. This thesis 
covers housing policies intended to affect both the supply side and the demand side of 
the housing market. New theoretical and empirical results and methodological 
innovations are presented. The analysis is also intended to serve housing policy makers 
in Finland and elsewhere. 
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. This chapter continues with a discussion 
of the distinctive features of housing markets, which is followed by a review of the main 
results of Chapters 2–4. Chapter 2 studies the effect of property taxes on housing 
2construction. Chapter 3 examines the welfare effects of the abolition of rent control for 
tenants. Chapter 4 analyzes the incentive effects of housing allowances.
1.1 Housing as a commodity 
Smith et al (1988) list heterogeneity, durability and spatial fixity as the most important 
properties of housing from the point of view of the economic modeling of housing 
markets.1 Taking these characteristics into account simultaneously has proven to be 
difficult. Which of them are formally modeled or emphasized varies according to the 
specific research theme addressed. The implications of the heterogeneity, durability and 
spatial fixity of housing and the way they are reflected in Chapters 2-4 are discussed 
here. In addition to these intrinsic characteristics of housing as a commodity, the 
extensive involvement of governments is an important aspect of the housing market. 
The most important housing policy instruments used in Finland are reviewed below. 
Durability
Housing units are durable goods with a very long life. The treatment of durability makes 
it necessary to separate the concepts of housing stock and the flow of housing services. 
The physical housing stock is a capital good yielding a flow of housing services, which 
is a consumption good. This dual nature of housing implies that households can obtain 
housing services either by renting or owning a house or a dwelling. Renters buy housing 
services from a landlord who owns the housing unit. Owner-occupiers own a housing 
unit, which provides them with housing services, but also serves as an investment asset. 
Thus, owner-occupiers’ decisions are affected by both consumption and investment 
motives.
Durability complicates empirical work since expenditure on housing services is not 
observed for home-owners. Housing expenditure comparable to rent paid by tenants has 
to be imputed. The appropriate expenditure measure is the annualized dwelling value, 
                                             
1 In his review of the economic modeling of the housing sector Arnott (1987) discusses extensively the 
special characteristics of housing and lists several market imperfections that might call for departures 
from a simple neoclassical model. Whitehead’s (1999) review of the developments in housing economics 
emphasizes policy analysis. Olsen (1987) reviews empirical studies on the demand and supply of housing.  
3termed the user cost, which includes mortgage interest payments, the opportunity cost of 
equity, various taxes and exemptions, capital gains, depreciation and other costs.2 Rents 
and house values are related since the price of a house reflects the discounted value of 
future ownership, either as rental income or as rent saved by an owner who occupies the 
house.
In Finland, roughly 65 per cent of households were owner occupiers and 35 per cent 
were renters in 2005. Renting is far less common in the markets for other durable goods, 
such as cars and home appliances. This suggests that owning might be an inherently 
superior way to obtain services provided by durable goods, but that there is something 
special about housing, which makes renting preferable for many households.  
Henderson and Ioannides (1983) argue that there is a negative externality related to 
renting. Renters utilize the dwelling they occupy more intensively than home-owners, 
because they do not take into account the costs to the landlord from increased wear and 
tear. Contract rent for a particular dwelling cannot be tied to the level of utilization, but 
the increased maintenance costs are reflected in the overall rent level. Therefore, the 
costs of owner-occupation are fundamentally lower than renting even in the absence of 
non-neutralities in taxation. If this is the case, why is there an extensive rental market 
for housing? Various explanations have appeared in the literature. One of the potential 
reasons is that transaction costs (see discussion on spatial fixity below) are higher in 
owner-occupied housing, and therefore households with short expected stays prefer to 
rent (Haurin and Gill, 2002 and Mills, 1990). Others have highlighted the significance 
of borrowing constraints (Duca and Rosenthal, 1994 and Linneman and Wachter, 1989). 
Since houses are far more expensive than most other durables, down payment 
requirements restrict the ability to buy housing for many households. Henderson and 
Ioannides (1983) argue that portfolio considerations are important (see also Fu, 1991). 
Housing cannot be bought in small proportions, unlike other assets such as stocks and 
bonds. Thus owner-occupation means that a substantial share of wealth is tied to a 
single risky asset (housing). The household chooses to rent if the disutility from less 
                                             
2 Saarimaa (2008a) draws up the user cost formula for the Finnish setting.  
4diversity in the investment portfolio exceeds the advantages of avoiding the costs of the 
negative rental externality. 3
The choice between owning and renting is one of the key housing decisions and the 
factors affecting tenure choice have been studied extensively. Early empirical studies 
analyzed tenure choice separately from the demand decision (e.g. Li, 1977). Lee and 
Trost (1978) and Rosen (1979) were the first to recognize that the discrete tenure choice 
decision and the continuous demand decision are interdependent, and hence tenure-
specific demand regressions may yield biased results. Later studies have addressed the 
dynamic aspects of housing decisions. Henderson and Ioannides (1989) were the first to 
estimate a joint model of tenure choice, demand for housing and length of stay (see also 
Goodman, 2003). The probability of owning has been found to depend positively on 
wealth and on the planned length of stay, which is related to lifecycle circumstances.  
Portfolio choice considerations and capital market imperfections help to understand why 
renting is more common among households with low income and low wealth. Fu (1991) 
shows that theoretically wealth is positively related to owner-occupation if investment 
demand for housing is more sensitive to income and wealth than consumption demand. 
Ioannides and Rosenthal (1994) find empirical support for the higher income elasticity 
of investment demand for housing. Furthermore, low-income households are more 
likely to be credit-constrained (Duca and Rosenthal, 1994). 
The fact that renting is more common in low-income groups has contributed to the 
emergence of housing policy instruments designed to guarantee adequate housing at 
reasonable cost for low-income renter households. This makes rental markets an 
interesting and important theme for research. Chapters 3 and 4 of this thesis focus on 
government intervention in rental markets. Chapter 3 studies the effects of rent control 
on tenant households’ welfare. Chapter 4 analyzes the incentive effects of the Finnish 
housing allowance system. Following earlier literature, tenure choice is not considered 
in these chapters. Studies that have a focus on specific policy instruments affecting 
                                             
3 Flavin and Yamashita (2002) estimate the effect of consumption demand for housing on portfolio 
allocation and show that consumption demand may cause housing to be over-represented in households’ 
portfolios. See Saarimaa (2008b) for an application with Finnish data. 
5rental housing demand typically estimate the demand effects of the policy without 
considering tenure choice.4
Durability also implies that the existing stock is large relative to the annual new 
construction of housing. Thus, in the short run, the supply of housing is virtually fixed 
and prices are determined by demand factors, such as interest rates and income. In the 
long run, housing stock develops through new construction, renovation and 
depreciation.5  Chapter 2 analyzes the effect of property taxation on the construction of 
new units (housing starts). The focus is on a tax reform which allowed municipalities to 
tax undeveloped residential lots at a higher tax rate than developed lots. The results 
suggest that introducing such a tax system, with a higher tax rate on land before 
development than after development, increases housing starts in the short run, but the 
effect seems to weaken after a couple of years. 
Heterogeneity
Housing is a heterogeneous commodity. It consists of several attributes which include 
the structural attributes of the dwelling, such as floor area and the physical condition of 
the dwelling, and location and neighborhood characteristics, such as the distance to the 
city center and the availability of recreational areas and public services. Literature on 
the demand and supply of housing can be divided into two categories based on how 
heterogeneity is addressed. The implications of these approaches for the analysis of 
housing demand are discussed here. The housing services approach treats housing as a 
one-dimensional continuous flow of housing services that arises from different 
characteristics. The characteristics approach accounts for heterogeneity explicitly by 
describing a housing unit as a list of several characteristics.
Regardless of which approach is taken, the household is assumed to face the constraint 
that their housing expenditure and expenditure on other goods must not exceed income. 
                                             
4 See e.g. Early (2000) and Ault and Saba (1990) for studies on rent control and Venti and Wise (1984) 
and Koning and Ridder (1997) for studies on the effects of housing allowances. 
5 DiPasquale and Wheaton (1996, Chapter 10) provide an easy-to-read treatment of stock-flow models of 
the dynamics of housing markets. Glaeser and Gyourko (2005) show that durability can explain many 
stylized facts of the dynamics of housing prices and growth patterns in urban areas.  
6Under the housing services approach, housing expenditure is defined as the product of 
the quantity of the homogenous housing services and the price per unit of this service. 
Households’ equilibrium is characterized by the condition that the marginal utilities of 
the two goods equal their prices. Under the characteristics approach, housing 
expenditure is allowed to be a flexible function of housing characteristics, called the 
hedonic function. The derivative of the hedonic function with respect to a characteristic 
is called the hedonic price or implicit price. In equilibrium, the marginal utilities of 
characteristics equal their implicit prices.  
Hedonic price models are a central tool in the empirical applications of both approaches. 
The basic idea of hedonic models is that regressing the values or rents of different kinds 
of units on their characteristics reveals the effects of characteristics on values or rents. 
The use of hedonic models under both approaches is briefly discussed here. For a more 
detailed discussion, see Malpezzi (2003), who surveys hedonic analysis with an 
emphasis on applied work, and Sheppard (1999), who concentrates more on the 
theoretical foundations of hedonic models under the characteristics approach.
Under the housing services approach, hedonic models are used in the measurement of 
the quantity and price of housing services. The challenge is that neither of them is 
directly observed. We observe only their product: the rent or value of the dwelling. 
There are two main approaches to decomposing housing expenditure into the quantity of 
housing services and price.6 Under the first approach, it is assumed that each household 
in a housing market area (city) at a given point in time faces the same price for housing 
services. When studying a single housing market area, housing price can be normalized 
to unity and housing services are given by rent. With data on many housing market 
areas, the price of a unit of housing services for each area is obtained by running a 
hedonic regression and using the prediction of the regression for a dwelling with fixed 
characteristics in different markets to construct a housing price index. The hedonic price 
index gives the relative price for a constant quality dwelling in different areas. The 
quantity estimate for each dwelling is then obtained by dividing the user cost or rent by 
the price index. The second approach defines housing services more narrowly to consist 
                                             
6 See Zabel (2004) for a discussion on the measurement of the quantity and price of housing services. 
7only of structural characteristics (see Olsen, 1987, p.998). It is assumed that similar 
dwellings in different locations produce the same amount of housing services. Hence, 
the prediction of the hedonic model for each dwelling (excluding location attributes) can 
be treated as an estimate of the amount of housing services and price is obtained by 
dividing rent or value by the prediction (see e.g. Malpezzi, 1998).7 The latter approach 
is used in Chapter 3 when estimating the price and quantity of housing in rental markets 
before and after the abolition of rent control. Intuitively, the latter approach defines 
housing services as an index of structural attributes with weights defined by the hedonic 
regression, and the price is measured as the deviation from the value of this index. The 
former approach, which presumes uniform prices within a city, would be problematic 
when estimating prices and quantities for rent controlled dwellings since rent control 
presumably distorts the effects of characteristics on rents so that prices for different 
units differ within a city.8
The housing services approach has been applied widely since it permits the use of 
standard econometric tools developed for homogenous goods. However, the theoretical 
foundations of the concept of homogenous housing services are weak (see Rouwendal, 
1998). The housing services approach abstracts away heterogeneity by assuming that a 
household is indifferent in respect of units that command the same rent in a housing 
market area. The characteristics approach treats housing explicitly as a 
multidimensional commodity and accounts for heterogeneity by describing a housing 
unit as a list of all of its characteristics. Under the characteristics approach it is possible, 
for instance, that a household values a unit with small floor area in a central location 
more than a unit with the same rent but larger floor area in a less central location. 
Housing expenditure enters the budget constraint in the form of the hedonic rent 
function, the form of which is determined in the interplay of consumers’ valuations of 
the characteristics and suppliers’ production functions. Sherwin Rosen (1974) set out a 
theoretical model of demand, supply and market equilibrium in this setting. Rosen 
                                             
7 Olsen (1987) argues that the latter approach is preferable since it is compatible with urban economic 
models, in which the price of housing depends negatively on the distance to city center. Zabel (2004) 
argues that the lower prices in less accessible locations come at the price of increased travel time and less 
leisure.  Thus, location should be included in the list of housing characteristics. 
8 Some authors (e.g. Ault and Saba, 1990 and Early, 2000) use welfare measures that do not require 
decomposing controled rents into quantity and price components.  
8(1974) also suggested an empirical method for estimating households’ preferences and 
producers’ production functions and a long debate on the identification of behavioral 
parameters in hedonic models followed.9 Ekeland, Heckman and Nesheim (2002 and 
2004) provide a critical review of this debate on identification in hedonic models. They 
establish that the generic non-linearity of the hedonic function can be used to identify 
the behavioral parameters of households and firms.  
The analysis in Chapter 4, which studies housing allowances (HA), falls between the 
two-dimensional housing services approach and the multidimensional characteristics 
approach. Housing is divided into two components; space and quality. Space is simply 
the floor area of the dwelling and quality includes all other characteristics. The division 
of housing into space and quality is needed to model the incentive effects of the HA 
scheme. In the HA system, there is an upper limit to acceptable rent per square meter. 
This can be interpreted as an upper limit to housing quality, since in the private rental 
market higher rent given floor area means that the dwelling is better in other respects. 
Hedonic regression is used to quantify the effects of the HA scheme on the hedonic 
prices of space and quality.
Spatial fixity 
The fact that housing is spatially fixed and cannot be moved from one place to another 
means that there are different housing market areas within a country. Typically, a city 
and the surrounding suburbs are regarded as a housing market area with a common price 
structure. In hedonic analysis, the location of the dwelling within the city is one of its 
important attributes. Unfortunately, the household level data sets used in Chapters 3 and 
4 do not include information on the location attributes of the dwellings. This may cause 
bias in the estimates for the hedonic prices of other attributes. However, in Chapter 4, 
we find that including a proxy for the distance to the city centre does not affect the other 
coefficients significantly.  
                                             
9 See Witte, Sumka and Erekson (1979), Brown and Harvey Rosen (1982), Bartik (1987) and Epple 
(1987). Laakso (1997) provides an application with Finnish data.  
9The spatial fixity and heterogeneity of housing together mean that adjusting housing 
consumption is costly. Minor changes in the structural attributes of the dwelling can be 
made through renovation, but typically adjusting housing consumption requires moving, 
which is costly in terms of money, time and effort. Searching for a new unit is also 
costly because acquiring information on the characteristics of available units requires 
visiting them. For mobile durables, such as cars and home appliances, search costs are 
much smaller since a large variety of products can be offered in one place. Because of 
the search and moving costs, households tolerate discrepancies between actual and 
desired housing consumption and they become active on the housing market only when 
the discrepancy is sufficiently large. Loikkanen (1982) provides a formal analysis of 
household behavior in the housing market in a theoretical search setting. The effects of 
search and moving costs are highlighted in Chapter 3, which studies the effect of rent 
control on the welfare costs of the gap between preferred housing consumption and 
actual housing consumption. It is argued that under rent control search and moving costs 
are higher than without rent control because when rents are artificially low there are 
many takers for each dwelling. Search and moving costs are also discussed in Chapter 4 
in the analysis of households’ responses to the incentives of the housing allowance 
system. For instance, Venti and Wise (1984) find empirical evidence that search and 
moving costs restrict the reactions of housing allowance recipients to the subsidy.
Spatial fixity also implies that when a household chooses a dwelling they choose 
simultaneously a community to live in. In his famous article Tiebout (1956) argued that 
households vote with their feet by choosing a municipality which provides their 
preferred combination of taxes and public services. See Wildasin (1986, 63–97) for a 
general study of households’ location choice and the determination of public 
expenditure, taxes and property values. The mobility of households and spatial fixity of 
housing units implies that local taxes and service levels will be capitalized in property 
values. Full capitalization of property tax liabilities is assumed in the theoretical part of 
Chapter 2.
10
Government involvement 
As the discussion above indicates, both national and local government are heavily 
involved in housing markets. Government interventions affecting the housing market 
include economic institutions, fiscal and monetary policy as well as policies directly 
targeted at the housing market. Countries differ in the specifics of their housing policy 
programs, but the level of involvement is high in comparison with most other products. 
A wide range of taxes, subsidies and forms of regulation are used. The interplay 
between different forms of government intervention determines the incentives for 
different housing choices and affects the distribution of welfare. The most important 
housing policy instruments currently in use in Finland are discussed below. Loikkanen 
and Lönnqvist (2007) provide an overview of the development of the institutional 
setting of the housing market in Finland.
The ownership of housing stock is taxed by municipalities in the form of property 
taxes.10 The Finnish property tax system is described in detail in Chapter 2.11 Returns 
on housing investment are taxed differentially depending on whether the owner 
occupies the unit or rents it out. Home-ownership is preferentially treated in taxation in 
Finland, as in most other countries. Often it is argued that the deductibility of mortgage 
interest payments constitutes the tax subsidy. In Finland, there is a dual income tax 
system with a progressive labor income tax and a flat-rate capital income tax. 12
Mortgage interest payments are deductible at the capital income tax rate (currently 28 
percent).13 However, the tax treatment of owner-occupied housing does not differ from 
rental housing in this respect since landlords’ interest expenses are also deductible. The 
real tax subsidy is that landlords’ rental income and capital gains are taxed, whereas rent 
saved by owner-occupiers and their capital gains are not taxed. According to Saarimaa’s 
                                             
10 Property taxes are rather low in Finland. They account for only 2.4 percent of total tax revenues, while 
in the UK, for instance, the share is over 10 percent (Englund, 2003). 
11 Property transactions are also subject to a stamp tax, which increases moving costs for owner 
occupiers. First time buyers are exempt from the stamp tax. 
12 Saarimaa (2005) studies the effect of the introduction of the dual income tax system in 1993 on debt 
financing of home acquisitions. Before the reform debt financing was more advantageous for high income 
home buyers since mortgage interests were deducted at a progressive rate. He finds that the probability of 
having a housing loan is less dependent on income after the reform. 
13 For first time buyers, the deductibility rate is 30 percent. 
11
(2008a) estimates, the value of the non-taxation of implicit rental income of home-
owners was 1.9 billion euro in 2004. The interest deduction equates the cost of loan 
finance and the opportunity cost of equity finance, which is the return on an alternative 
asset net of capital gains tax. Hence, cutting the deductibility of mortgage interest 
payments would make debt finance costlier than equity finance and especially hurt those 
with low wealth, notably young households. See Englund (2003) for a review of the 
effects of taxing residential housing capital. 
Apart from the tax subsidy for home-ownership, the government subsidizes housing 
demand through housing allowances for working age people and pensioners and the 
students’ housing supplement. In 2006, the total outlays of these subsidies amounted to 
1 billion euro. Chapter 4 studies the incentive effects of the general housing allowance 
system targeted at working age people. The government also offers subsidized loans to 
municipalities and non-profit investors to build social housing (ARAVA loans). Access 
to social housing is means-tested, and tenants are subject to criteria regarding 
spaciousness etc. The construction of social housing with ARAVA funding has declined 
since the deregulation of financial markets in the late 1980s, which made more funding 
available for developers. However, a significant share of the housing stock is still social 
housing. In 2005, roughly 15 per cent of households lived in social rental housing 
provided by municipalities and non-profit organizations (including student housing 
associations). 
Why is there such a wide range of policies that subsidize home-ownership and the level 
of housing consumption? Why not just give households the money spent on housing 
subsidies as non-earmarked cash transfers and let them decide how to use it? According 
to standard economic theory, a household would be better off with such a cash transfer 
than when given the same amount in the form of distorting subsidies (e.g. housing 
allowance or home-owners’ tax subsidy) or an in kind transfer (social housing). 
Subsidizing home-ownership has been rationalized by its positive effects on the 
surrounding community. It has been argued, for instance, that home-owners take better 
care on their houses and vote for long term investments rather than short term transfers. 
Housing allowances and social housing programs have more often been rationalized by 
equity arguments. These arguments rely on paternalistic views that subsidy recipients do 
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not know their own best, or that the person who makes the household’s consumption 
decisions does not take into account the wishes of all the family members (Olsen, 2001). 
It has also been argued that low quality housing causes crime, fires, disease etc. Rosen 
(1985) reviews the equity and efficiency arguments for subsidizing housing 
consumption. Glaeser and Saphiro (2002) study a wide range of externalities related to 
home-ownership and the level of housing consumption. They find evidence of positive 
externalities related to home-ownership but not to the level of housing consumption.   
Previously, the institutional setting of the Finnish housing market was characterized by 
a high degree of regulation, including financial market regulation and rent control. 
Government regulations affecting the housing market have lessened since the 1980s. 
Capital import restrictions and interest rate regulation were abolished in the late 1980s 
and rent control of privately funded rental housing was abolished in the mid 1990s. 
Laakso (2000), among others, argues that the liberalization of the financial markets was 
an important factor behind the housing price boom in the 1980s, which was followed by 
a bust in the early 1990s. Housing prices fell by roughly 50 per cent from 1989 to 1993. 
The Finnish rent control system and the deregulation of the rental market are discussed 
in Chapter 3, which examines the welfare effects of rent control. Rent control still exists 
for ARAVA and interest subsidy (korkotuki) dwellings, which are built with loans 
subsidized by the government. In the capital, Helsinki, there is also a system of price 
controls on part of the owner-occupied housing stock. The HITAS system controls the 
resale prices of dwellings built on lots rented by the city of Helsinki at below market 
rents. The HITAS system is an interesting topic for further research.
Zoning and land use regulations are important policy instruments for municipalities in 
Finland. Municipalities have a zoning monopoly on the land within their borders. There 
are two principal ways of developing raw land. The municipality can buy raw land from 
private landowners or from the government and draw up a plan for the purchased area, 
which is then sold or rented to households or developer firms. The main alternative is to 
use development contracts, which obligate the landowner (typically a large construction 
firm) to build infrastructure in the area in exchange for zoning. Zoning and land use 
regulations are subject to ongoing research. Glaeser, Gyourko and Saks (2005) and 
Glaeser and Gyourko (2003) argue that, in the U.S., regulations that limit housing 
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supply have increased and account for much of the appreciation in house prices in 
recent decades.  
1.2 Contents of the dissertation 
CHAPTER 2: The effect of three-rate property taxation on housing construction
Chapter 2 of this dissertation examines the effect on housing construction of the Finnish 
property tax system. The current Finnish property tax system allows undeveloped 
residential land to be taxed at a higher rate than developed land. This is an interesting 
and unique example of the use of property taxes to encourage housing construction. The 
main purpose of the study is to examine the effects of the pre-development land tax on 
housing construction both theoretically and empirically. Also the effects of other 
property taxes are analyzed.
The theoretical part of Chapter 2 provides a background for the empirical analysis of the 
effects of property taxes on housing starts, but it is also related to the long discussion on 
the neutrality of land taxation, which was started by Henry George (1879). He proposed 
that other taxes should be replaced by a confiscatory tax on land rent, and landowners 
would still put the land they own to its best possible use. Whether land taxation distorts 
landowners’ choices as to when to build and how much to build has, at times, been 
subject to heated debate (see for instance Mills, 1981 and 1982; Bentick, 1982 and 
Tideman, 1982). Arnott (2005) reviews the discussion on the neutrality of land tax, and 
concludes that neutrality is achieved if the tax base is suitably defined. He makes a 
distinction between “residual site value” and “raw site value”. Residual site value is the 
value of a plot of land less the replacement cost of the building on it. Raw site value is 
the value of the site if there were no buildings on it, even if in fact there are. A tax on 
residual site value distorts development decisions since the tax base can be affected by 
building more or less. Raw site value taxation is neutral since the tax payable does not 
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depend on how much is built.14 A landowner views a land tax based on raw site value as 
a lump-sum tax and his decisions are unaffected by it.
The tax base of land in the Finnish property tax system satisfies the definition of raw 
site value since the taxable value of a lot is calculated based on transactions for vacant 
lots in the same area. Interestingly, Arnott (2005) argues that raw site value cannot be 
used in practice since estimating the raw site value in highly developed areas with few 
land transactions would be too difficult. In Finland, the practical difficulties have 
apparently been overcome and the Finnish property tax system provides an example of 
the ideas of neutral land taxation put into practice.
However, a tax reform in 2001 broke the neutrality of land taxation. The reform allowed 
municipalities to levy an extra property tax on undeveloped land zoned for housing. The 
aim of the reform was to encourage housing construction. As of 2007, almost 30 per 
cent of municipalities had implemented the new three-rate tax system with different tax 
rates on land pre-development, land post-development and buildings. The remaining 
municipalities have a two-rate system with a uniform land tax and a building tax. A 
theoretical model of decisions by landowners under the Finnish property tax system 
shows that land tax is neutral in the two-rate system. In the three-rate system, this 
neutrality is broken and higher pre-development land tax ought to lead to faster 
development. As a side effect, the density of development may also be affected.  
The empirical results suggest that adopting the three-rate property tax system increased 
single-family housing starts annually by roughly 10 per cent on average. The size of 
new single-family units was not affected. The findings regarding the time pattern of the 
effect suggest that the positive effect on the number of starts weakens after a couple of 
years. The results support the theoretical finding that land tax ought to be neutral in the 
two-rate system. The effect of the tax on buildings is also insignificant. The estimate of 
the price elasticity of single-family housing starts was close to unity, implying that the 
production of detached single-family housing units responds reasonably well to changes 
in housing prices.
                                             
14 This result was shown as early as 1914 by B.M. Anderson Jr.  
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CHAPTER 3: Rent control and tenants’ welfare: The effects of deregulating rental 
markets in Finland 
Housing is one of the few sectors in which prices are still controlled by governments or 
local jurisdictions, even in many developed countries. Typically the price controls 
pertain to rental housing. Even in the United States, which is generally thought of as a 
liberal market economy, rent control exists in some areas. In Finland, rent control of the 
non-subsidized private rental sector was gradually abolished in 1992–1995. Chapter 3 of 
this dissertation studies the effects of rent control on the economic welfare of 
households in rent-controlled dwellings. The empirical part uses Finnish household-
level data from before and after the abolition of rent control. 
According to standard economic theory, setting the price of a good artificially below its 
market level reduces the amount of that good supplied. The reduction in supply 
arguably leads to welfare losses since households that would have been willing to rent at 
the market price are left without dwellings and the landlords of those dwellings also 
forgo their surplus. The descriptive part of Chapter 3 shows that the stock of private 
rental dwellings developed as predicted by standard theory. The number of private 
rental dwellings declined dramatically during the rent control period but recovered 
fairly quickly when rent control was abolished. 
The welfare losses from reduced supply are not estimated in Chapter 3. The analysis 
deals solely with the measurement of the costs and benefits of rent control for those who 
managed to obtain a rent-controlled dwelling. Tenants in rent-controlled dwellings 
benefit from rent control in the form of low rent, but they may also suffer a welfare loss 
because in a rent-controlled situation there are many takers for each dwelling and 
finding a suitable dwelling is more difficult than in the absence of rent control. Hence 
under rent control we would expect, for instance, to find more large families occupying 
small dwellings and single persons occupying large dwellings. Glaeser and Luttmer 
(2003) argue that these misallocation costs may be substantial and should be taken into 
account when evaluating rent control programs. 
The focus of Chapter 3 is on the methods for measuring these welfare costs. Previous 
studies on the costs and benefits of rent control to tenants have assumed that the 
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household would consume on its demand for housing curve in the absence of rent 
control but not necessarily under rent control. The assumption of no disequilibrium in 
consumption can be criticized both on theoretical and empirical grounds. The theoretical 
argument against the assumption is that search and moving costs also exist in the 
uncontrolled market. Hence the question is not whether disequilibrium costs exist under 
rent control, but rather whether they are larger than in the absence of rent control. The 
empirical point is that observed housing consumption differs from predicted demand 
also because of heterogeneity in preferences, measurement errors, misspecification 
errors and statistical error in the demand estimates. Studies that assume consumption on 
the estimated demand curve without rent control interpret all of the aforementioned 
sources of inaccuracy in demand estimates as misallocation due to rent control. This 
study also interprets the residual between predicted and observed housing consumption 
as disequilibrium, but unlike earlier studies, the controlled situation and uncontrolled 
situation are treated equally in this respect. 
The assumption of perfect and instantaneous optimization in the uncontrolled situation 
is relaxed in Chapter 3 and welfare measures that also allow for divergences from the 
demand curve in the absence of rent control are derived. It is shown that earlier studies 
that assume consumption on the estimated demand curve under rent control but not in 
the absence of rent control produce downward-biased estimates of the net benefit of rent 
control to tenants. The empirical application with Finnish data illustrates the 
implementation of the welfare measures. The results suggest that welfare losses due to 
the increased mismatch between households and dwellings offset much of the benefit of 
below-market rents to tenants. 
CHAPTER 4: Incentive effects of the Finnish housing allowance system: Theory and 
empirical analysis 
Chapter 4 analyzes the impact of the Finnish housing allowance (HA) system on the 
housing choices of tenant households. The paper builds a theoretical model of the 
incentive structure created by the allowance system and analyzes empirically some of its 
implications.  
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The theoretical model considers the effect of being eligible for HA on households’ 
budget constraints in a three-commodity framework: housing space, housing quality, 
and other goods. An accurate model of the incentive structure created by the HA 
scheme requires a three-dimensional framework since there is an upper limit to housing 
space and rent per square meter. If these ceilings are exceeded, the allowance is based 
on the ceiling value instead of the actual rent. In the private rental market, higher rent 
per given floor area can be interpreted as a sign of higher quality. Thus, the amount of 
HA depends not only on the rent paid, but also on the space-quality combination 
provided by the dwelling. The budget constraint of an eligible household cannot be 
drawn in the two-dimensional framework with housing services and other goods as the 
two commodities, since HA granted to the household depends on the space-quality 
combination provided by the dwelling. The theoretical part of the study suggests that the 
HA system creates strong incentives to move to dwellings in which the space and 
quality ceilings are met.  
The empirical part of the paper first examines whether eligible households seem to 
optimize their housing choices with respect to the space and quality ceilings. The 
distributions of eligible and non-eligible households with respect to the ceilings are 
compared, and the distributions are found to be very similar. Hence it seems that 
eligible households do not react strongly to the incentives of the HA scheme. 
Furthermore, we do not find evidence that the probability of moving is positively 
affected by the potential gain in HA attainable through moving. Since the variables 
associated with moving costs are controlled for, the result suggests that households’ 
knowledge of the HA scheme is weak. Another possible explanation for the sluggish 
response to incentives is incomplete take-up of the subsidy. We find that the take-up 
rate is roughly 65-80 per cent, and is affected e.g. by education, HA entitlement, and 
income expectations.  
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2 The effect of three-rate property taxation on 
housing construction 
2.1 Introduction
In 2001, Finnish municipalities were allowed to tax undeveloped land zoned for housing 
at a higher property tax rate than developed land. The aim of the reform was to give 
municipalities a way to encourage housing construction by creating tax incentives to 
develop land zoned for housing. It was hoped that the reform would curb house price 
inflation by increasing housing supply. By 2007, 30 per cent of Finnish municipalities 
had adopted the reform. These municipalities have a three-rate property tax system with 
different tax rates on imputed land value pre and post development and a separate tax 
rate on buildings. The remaining municipalities have a two-rate property tax system 
with a uniform residential land tax and a building tax. This paper studies the effects of 
the Finnish type three-rate system on residential development both theoretically and 
empirically.  
In addition to the option of three-rate taxation, another interesting feature of the Finnish 
property tax system is the way the taxable value of land is defined. In previous 
literature, three-rate taxation has been modeled in the case where taxable value of land 
post-development is defined as the market value of the whole property less replacement 
cost of the building. In Finland post-development taxable value is defined as “what the 
site would be worth if there were no structure on it”. Following Arnott [2], the former 
definition of site value is termed residual site value and the latter raw site value, since it 
is independent of developer’s actions. There has been a long discussion in the literature 
concerning the neutrality of taxation of land. Arnott [2] provides an overview of this 
discussion and concludes that a tax on land is neutral if the taxable value of land does 
not depend on landowner’s actions. Raw site value satisfies this condition. Thus, in 
Finnish two-rate municipalities tax on land should be neutral. The preferential treatment 
of developed land under the three-rate system breaks this neutrality. 
Both two-rate and three-rate property tax systems have been analyzed in the theoretical 
literature on urban development and there are empirical studies using data from two-rate 
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jurisdictions (see Plassmann & Tideman [11]). However, the three-rate system with 
preferential treatment for developed land and raw site value as the tax base has neither 
been applied explicitly in practice elsewhere nor studied theoretically or empirically.15
The theoretical part of this paper draws on Turnbull’s [16] dynamic model of a 
landowner considering the timing and density of development on a parcel of land he 
owns. The model is modified to describe the Finnish type three-rate system by defining 
the tax base to be raw site value and by assuming preferential tax treatment for 
developed land, not for undeveloped land. It is found that wider difference between pre- 
and post-development land taxes speeds development. However, as a side effect of 
faster development the density of development may also be affected.  
Turnbull’s [16] model is based on the model of Arnott and Lewis [3], which considers 
the development timing and density decision of a landowner in a dynamic setting where 
development is irreversible and additions cannot be made later. Arnott and Lewis build 
on earlier work on the development timing decision by Shoulp [12]. More recent 
contributions include McFarlane [9], who considers the effect of various taxes and fees 
on construction activity in the type of urban economy depicted by Capozza and Helsley 
[6], and Arnott [2] and Arnott & Petrova [1], who discuss how neutrality is achieved in 
different tax systems. Capozza and Li [5] describe the landowner’s problem in a 
stochastic framework. From the point of view of empirical work, the lesson to be 
learned from the theoretical models of a landowner’s development decision is that the 
effect of property taxes on construction is often ambiguous or the sign and magnitude of 
the effect depends on market conditions which cannot be measured accurately. The 
Finnish-type pre-development land tax is an exception in this respect since at least its 
qualitative effect on timing is unambiguous a priori.  
Plassmann & Tideman [11] review empirical studies on the effects of property taxes on 
construction activity. Most empirical studies have failed to find significant effects. In 
their own analysis Plassmann & Tideman [11] find that the difference between tax on 
                                             
15 In most countries, land and buildings are taxed at the same rate but some jurisdictions, e.g. some 
municipalities in Pennsylvania U.S.A., have taxed land at a higher rate than buildings. Some jurisdictions 
may implicitly tax land before and after development at different effective tax rates by applying different 
assessment methods for developed and undeveloped land. 
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land and tax on buildings has a positive effect on the number of building permits but no 
significant effect on value per permit.  
Panel data for Finnish municipalities are used in the empirical part. Building permits are 
typically used as the dependent variable in empirical papers on property taxes and 
development. We use actual housing starts instead. Following Plassmann & Tideman 
[11], count data analysis is chosen as the econometric framework. The effect of property 
taxes on housing starts is examined by estimating fixed-effects Poisson count data 
models of single family housing starts on tax variables and control variables. Two 
measures of housing starts are used: 1) number of dwellings, and 2) volume of housing 
starts in cubic meters. The number of dwellings measures the number of new units and 
reflects development timing considerations by landowners. The volume of buildings 
started measures the amount of structural housing services produced and is aimed at 
capturing both the effects of timing and development density considerations. The 
empirical results are consistent with theory. 
Section 2.2 describes the Finnish property tax system. Section 2.3 presents a theoretical 
model of the effects of property taxes on the timing and density of housing construction 
and discusses the implications of the results for empirical work. Section 2.4 discusses 
the empirical model. Section 2.5 presents the data and the empirical results. Section 2.6 
concludes.
2.2 The Finnish property tax system 
In Finland, there has been a municipal property tax since 1993. The tax is payable by 
those who own the taxable property at the beginning of the calendar year. All zoned 
land and buildings are subject to property taxation. Agricultural land and forests are not 
taxed, unless the town plan or master plan permits residential or commercial 
construction on it. The taxable value of buildings is 70 per cent of their replacement 
cost, adjusted for depreciation. The target taxable value of both developed and 
undeveloped zoned land is 73.5 percent of the annually evaluated local market price of a 
similar undeveloped lot. However, the valuation regulations allow concessions when 
land prices are rising. Thus in practice taxable values may follow market values 
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sluggishly. The valuation method utilizes regional data on transactions of vacant lots. 
The data are used to estimate the market value of a square meter of land zoned for 
different purposes. For lots with building permits the estimated value of building 
permits is included in the calculation. Property tax is deductible in income taxation, 
provided that the property has been used for rental or business purposes. All the 
property of the taxpayer was also subject to net wealth tax until 2006, when the wealth 
tax was abolished. 
The current Finnish property tax system allows municipalities to apply different tax 
rates on different types of real property. Here only the taxation of residential land and 
buildings is discussed.16 Municipalities decide annually, within limits set by the 
government, what rates will be used in their particular municipality for each type of real 
property. In 2007, the limits set for property tax rates are the following: 
- general property tax 0.50 – 1.00 per cent (zoned land, commercial buildings, 
etc.)
- property tax on permanent dwellings  0.22 – 0.50 per cent 
- property tax on undeveloped residential lots 1.00 – 3.00 per cent 
Applying the undeveloped residential land tax is optional. If the municipality chooses 
not to apply it, undeveloped residential lots will be taxed at the general property tax 
rate. Before the reform of 2001, all land was taxed at the general property tax rate, but 
the reform gave municipalities the option to tax undeveloped land at a higher rate. 
Whether the pre- or post-development land tax is applied depends on the state of the site 
at the beginning of the year. The site is regarded as undeveloped until foundation work 
starts. The pre-development land tax can be applied only to lots that are zoned for 
residential purposes and have sufficient infrastructure.  
Table 1 shows the proportion of municipalities with a three-rate property tax system in 
2000–2007. Roughly 11 per cent of municipalities adopted the three-rate system right 
from the beginning in 2001, and the share of three-rate municipalities has been rising 
                                             
16 In addition, it is possible to apply separate rates to non-permanent dwellings (vacation homes), non-
profit organizations and power stations. 
25
thereafter. In 2006, the share of municipalities with a three-rate system rose from 20 to 
27 per cent, partly because the government forced 14 municipalities in the province of 
Uusimaa around the capital Helsinki to introduce the three-rate system with a pre-
development land tax at least one percentage point higher than the post-development 
land tax. Two of these municipalities already had a three-rate system, and thus only 12 
municipalities were affected. In 2007, almost 30 per cent of municipalities have a three-
rate system. Only a few of the municipalities that introduced the three-rate system have 
switched back to the two-rate system. There were a total of nine transitions from a 
three-rate to a two-rate system in the period 2001 – 2007. 
Table 1. The proportion of municipalities with three-rate property tax 
(N=398*)
  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Three-rate property 
tax system % 0 10.6 12.8 14.5 18.1 19.8 27.3 29.4
Two-rate property tax 
system % 100 89.4 87.2 85.5 81.9 80.2 72.7 70.6
*
 Province of Åland and municipalities that merged with another municipality in 2001–2007 excluded.  
Along with the imposition of three-rate taxation in the Helsinki area, a concession was 
made which may limit the potential effect of three-rate taxation on construction activity 
in the 12 Helsinki area municipalities. Pre-development land tax is not applied to lots 
owned by a household occupying a house built on a neighboring lot. Thus the three-rate 
tax does not apply, for instance, to so-called veterans’ house (rintamamiestalo) lots. 
These single-family houses were built after WWII on large lots, which are typically not 
built up to the full efficiency permitted by the town plan. One of the channels through 
which three-rate taxation could increase single-family unit construction is the incentive 
to sell parts of these lots, provided that the lot has been split in the town plan. Moreover, 
three-rate taxation was imposed within a short time span. Typically, there is a one year 
transition period between the decision to switch to a three-rate system and the actual 
introduction of the system. As regards the 12 Helsinki region municipalities, the 
government proposal for the three-rate system in 2006 was only issued in October 2005. 
Thus one would expect the three-rate taxation to take effect later and to be weaker in the 
12 Helsinki region municipalities than in the municipalities that chose three-rate 
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taxation voluntarily. Because of these differences with the voluntary introduction of the 
three-rate system, the 12 municipalities with an imposed three-rate tax are dropped from 
the data in the econometric part.  
As for the geographical distribution of three-rate municipalities, a disproportionally 
large share of regional centers (large cities and towns) have a three-rate system. The 
three-rate system also seems to be slightly more common in municipalities surrounding 
regional centers, but there are also many three-rate municipalities outside densely 
populated urban areas. 
Local income tax and certain shares of corporate tax revenues are the main sources of 
revenue for Finnish municipalities. Property taxes are a relatively unimportant source of 
revenue.17 The empirical part shows that, even though revenues are low, the pre-
development land tax has significant effects on housing construction. 
2.3 Theoretical model 
This section presents a theoretical model of the effects of property taxes on housing 
construction. Turnbull’s [16] model was chosen as the basis since his definition of the 
landowner’s value function imposes minimal assumptions on the determination of urban 
rents stemming from capital used in construction. The model is modified to describe the 
Finnish property tax system by defining the tax base of land taxes to be raw site value 
instead of residual site value and by assuming that the pre-development land tax rate is 
higher than the post-development land tax rate. Turnbull analyzed the opposite case.  
The model discussed here is a dynamic model of an atomistic landowner who considers 
simultaneously the timing and density of development on a previously undeveloped 
parcel of land he owns. Once the land is developed, the buildings are immutable. The 
following notation is used: 
                                             
17 In 2005, total municipality tax revenue was € 14.2 billion or € 2700 per person, while building tax 
revenue per person was only € 41 per person and general property tax revenue € 84 per person. Note that 
the general property tax is also applied to non-residential land and commercial buildings. Even though 
pre-development land tax rates are much higher than other property tax rates, the tax-base of the pre-
development tax is so narrow that revenues are negligible compared to other property taxes. Pre-
development tax revenues in three-rate municipalities amounted to less than € 2 per person in 2005. 
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K = the amount of capital used in construction 
r = interest rate 
R(K,t) = market rent 
R*(t) = land rent in non-housing use 
b? = effective pre-development land tax rate 
a?  = effective post-development land tax rate 
? = effective building tax rate 
The rent function R translates the amount of capital used in construction to rent. The 
factors affecting the rent function include demand for housing, construction costs, 
production technology etc. It is assumed that marginal returns are diminishing (RK > 0 
and RKK < 0). It will be shown that the comparative static results depend crucially on the 
time derivative of the marginal rent RKt, which is allowed to take negative or positive 
values.
The landowner’s problem is to choose the time of development T and the amount of 
capital used K so as to maximize the value of the site. Following the conventional 
parlance of the literature, capital used in construction will be also referred to as 
development density. The landowner’s objective function V(K,T) is the present value of 
the plot of land given structural density K and development time T. The present value of 
the plot at time t < T is written as 
(1) ? ??
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The first term on the RHS is the present value of agricultural and other non-urban rents 
before development and the second term is the present value of urban rent less the 
opportunity cost of capital. The last three terms represent the present values of property 
tax liabilities. The tax base of the property tax on buildings is construction cost K and 
the effective tax rate is denoted by ? . Depreciation is neglected here. The pre-
development effective land tax rate is denoted by b?  and the post-development effective 
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land tax rate is a? . The tax base of taxes on land is raw site value )(tV , which is the 
market price of the vacant lot until the lot is developed and after that the hypothetical 
market price of the lot if there were no building on it. The developer’s actions do not 
affect )(tV  and hence )(tV  is independent of T and K (see Arnott, [2]). The definition 
of the tax base of land taxes is the key difference between the analysis here and in 
Turnbull [16]. He defines the tax base of land taxes to be the market value of the whole 
property less replacement cost of the structure, which depends on T and K. Furthermore, 
in order to make the model representative of the Finnish system, Turnbull’s [16] 
assumption that ab ?? ?  is replaced with ab ?? ? .
Differentiating with respect to K and T gives the following first-order necessary 
conditions (FOCs) for structural density and the timing of development. 
The structural density condition is given as 
(2) 0)(),( )()( ???? ?
?
?? Ttr
T
str
KK er
rdsetKRV ? .
The density condition states that the present value of an incremental increase in rent 
from higher capital intensity equals the discounted additional development cost. The 
density condition is unaffected by land taxes and the tax on buildings increases the 
marginal costs of development. Thus, for further use when deriving the comparative 
static results of taxes we have 0??
ab KK
VV ?? and 0??KV .
Applying Leibnitz’s rule to (1) we get the following timing condition 
(3) 0)]()(),()(*)[( )( ??????? ?TtrabT eTVTKRTRKrV ???
The condition states that the landowner waits until the benefits of waiting, which consist 
of the cost of capital and agricultural rent, equal the costs of waiting, which consist of 
urban rent forgone and the difference between pre and post development land taxes at 
time T. It is seen that a higher pre-development tax increases costs of waiting, post-
development tax decreases costs of waiting and building tax increases benefits of 
waiting by increasing the cost of capital. Furthermore, post-development tax and 
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building tax are capitalized in the taxable value of land at development time )(TV ,
which magnifies slightly their delaying effect on development timing. However, the 
capitalization effect is minuscule with realistic tax rates and can be neglected. For 
further use we have 0?
bT
V ? , 0?aTV ?  and 0??TV .
Under a two-rate system the last term in (3) is zero and, hence a uniform land tax on 
raw site value is neutral. It does not affect developer’s decisions in any way (see Arnott 
[2] for more discussion). In a two-rate system with residual site value as the tax base, 
land tax hastens development if RKt < 0 or RKt > 0 and is neutral only if RKt = 0 
(Turnbull, [16]). 
Second order conditions 0?KKV , 0?TTV  and 0)(
2 ??? JVVV TKKKTT  are assumed to 
hold when deriving comparative statics. Further, we follow Turnbull [16] and express 
)()](),([ TtrKKT erTKRV
????? ?  as a function of the change in marginal rents over 
time (RKt). Rewriting (2) as 0)](),([ )( ???? ?
?
?
T
str
KK dsersKRV ? , integrating by parts 
and rearranging yields 
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This expression for VKT provides important insight into the connection between the 
comparative statics and market conditions. It is seen that the sign of VKT is determined 
by the sign of the time derivative of marginal rent (RKt). The intuition is as follows. If 
rents for more capital-intensive land use are rising over time (RKt > 0), postponing 
development moves development to a time with higher optimal density. Capital and 
development time are said to be complements in the land profit function. On the other 
hand, if rents are decreasing (RKt < 0), postponing development moves construction to a 
time with lower optimal density. In this case, capital and time are substitutes. Finally, if 
rents are stable, postponing construction does not affect optimal density and capital and 
time are unrelated. 
The first-order conditions (2) and (3) define the optimal combinations of capital and 
development time for the lot. Figure 1 depicts the loci of combinations of capital and 
development time that satisfy the FOCs. Development occurs where the lines cross. The 
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slopes of the lines depicting the FOCs are found by applying the implicit function 
theorem to the FOCs. The slopes are 
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From the second-order conditions for the interior solution, we get that VTT < 0 and     
VKK < 0. The sign of VTK depends on the shape of the rent function R(K,t) as shown 
above. Both FOCT and FOCK are upward-sloping in the T-K space if RKt > 0, that is, if 
the additional rent for more capital-intensive land use is rising over time. If RKt < 0, the 
FOC lines are downward-sloping. From (5) and the second-order 
condition 0)(
2 ?? KTKKTT VVV  it follows that the locus of FOCT has to be steeper than 
that of FOCK for there to be an interior solution. Accordingly, if RKt = 0, the FOCT line 
is vertical and FOCK is horizontal.18 The solid lines in Figure 1 depict the FOCs in the 
T-K space. The panel on the left depicts the situation with increasing optimal density, 
the centre panel with decreasing optimal density and the right panel with stable optimal 
density.
Figure 1. Optimal timing and density decisions when pre-development tax increases.
                                             
18 In the literature, agricultural rent R*(t) is often assumed to be zero or constant (e.g. Arnott & Petrova 
[1] and Capozza & Li [5]). In the absence of agricultural rents, the second-order condition VTT < 0 implies 
that development takes place only if returns on housing investment are rising. Adding agricultural rent to 
the model makes development possible also with decreasing returns on housing investment. The second-
order condition VTT < 0 then requires that returns on housing investment are growing faster or declining 
slower than agricultural rent. 
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Again applying the implicit function theorem, we see how changes in tax rates move the 
FOC lines depicted in Figure 1. For the pre-development land tax, we obtain 
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An increase in the pre-development tax shifts the FOCT line to the left and FOCK is 
unaffected. In Figure 1, it is seen that a higher pre-development tax leads to faster 
development regardless of market conditions. If optimal density is increasing 
(decreasing) over time, a higher pre-development tax leads to lower (higher) density by 
moving construction to a time with lower (higher) optimal density. The effect of post-
development tax is opposite to that of pre-development tax.  
Figure 2 shows the effects of the tax on buildings on the development decision. A 
higher building tax rate delays development (given density) and discourages density 
(given development time). We have  
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Thus, the timing condition line shifts to the right and the density condition line shifts 
down. It is seen that the combined effect is delayed development and lower density if 
the returns on housing investment are stable or decreasing over time (center and right 
panels in Fig. 2). The effect of the building tax is ambiguous if returns are increasing 
over time (left panel in Fig. 2). In the latter case, however, it is not possible for density 
to increase and development to be faster. The effect of building tax is the same under 
raw site value taxation and residual site value taxation analyzed in Turnbull [16]. 
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Figure 2. Optimal timing and density decisions when building tax increases. 
Land use regulations 
The effect of land use regulations, such as zoning, is relatively straightforward to 
include in the model (see Turnbull [15], [14] and [13]). A binding upper limit to 
development density makes the density condition irrelevant and property taxes affect 
only timing. Binding density restrictions speed (slow) development when returns on 
housing investment are rising (falling) over time (Turnbull [15] and [14]). The effects of 
property taxes with binding upper limits to K can be easily seen by drawing a horizontal 
line below the optimal K in Figures 1 and 2. Development takes place at the time when 
the timing condition line crosses the development density limit. Development density is 
determined by the limit and the effect of property taxes on development time is 
determined solely by their effects on the timing condition. For a parcel with a binding 
upper limit to density, the pre-development land tax hastens development and building 
tax delays development. In Finland, all residential lots are assigned a maximum allowed 
number of square meters. It is not clear whether the model with or without binding 
density restrictions is empirically more relevant. 
Implications for empirical work
The data used in this study comprises municipalities with two-rate or three-rate tax 
systems. Some of the municipalities switch from a two-rate to a three-rate system by 
introducing a pre-development land tax. In three-rate municipalities land after 
development is taxed at the general property tax rate and the pre-development tax is 
higher than the general rate. In two-rate municipalities the pre-development and post-
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development land tax rates are the same (the general property tax rate). In the 
econometric part, the effect of pre-development tax is modeled through the difference 
between pre-and post-development land taxes )( ab ?? ?  since no value can be assigned 
to pre-development tax under a two-rate system. 
Housing starts are regressed on the difference between pre-and post-development land 
taxes )( ab ?? ?  and on the post-development land tax rate and the building tax rate. 
Thus the estimate of the effect of a?  in the three-rate system pertains to the situation 
where )( ab ?? ?  is fixed. Theoretically higher a? ought to weaken the effect of the tax 
rate difference through its negative effect on )(TV , but since a?  is low and has a very  
narrow range (0.5-1 per cent), the capitalization effect can be expected to be negligible. 
The range of building tax is (0.22-0.5 per cent), and hence, the extent to which the effect 
of the tax rate difference is affected by differences in?  should be negligible, too. Thus, 
the effect of building tax ought to be approximately the same under two-rate and three-
rate regimes, and the general property tax ought to be (approximately) neutral in both 
systems.  
An important observation from the theoretical model is that the effects of property taxes 
on starting time and density depend crucially on the form of the rent function R.
Therefore, from the point of view of empirical work, it is important to take a closer look 
at the rent function. 
Let us consider a case where the rent function is the product of the rental rate (p) for a 
unit of buildings on the site and the building production function Q, which has the 
properties QK > 0 and QKK < 0. The production function gives the amount of building 
produced by using K euro of capital. First assume that the building production function 
does not change over time. For instance, Arnott and Petrova [1] write the urban rent 
function as )()(),( KQtptKR ? .  It is seen that KtR can be negative only if the rental rate 
is decreasing. 
Now also let the building production function change over time. The rent function 
becomes ),()(),( tKQtptKR ?  and ),()(),()('),( tKQtptKQtptKR KtKKt ?? . Thus, the 
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incremental rent for an additional euro of capital used to build housing may decrease 
even when the rental rate is increasing. Changes in prices of construction inputs, for 
example, cause Q to change over time. Thus, rising housing prices or rents do not 
necessarily indicate rising returns on new housing investment, which makes it difficult 
to measure KtR .
The theoretical model presented in this section is deterministic and assumes that the 
developer knows future rents with certainty. In practice, there is uncertainty about the 
factors affecting returns on housing investment and developers base their decisions on 
expectations. In the empirical part of the paper, a set of quarterly time indicators is 
included in the model to catch the variation in current and expected construction costs, 
interest rates and other country-wide factors possibly affecting construction. The 
regional housing price index and the ratio of housing stock to population are included in 
the explanatory variables in order to capture current and expected rents. 
Because of the difficulty in measuring the expected change in the rent function, the 
empirical model cannot test all the predictions of the theoretical model. However, the 
qualitative effect of pre-development land tax does not depend on market conditions. 
Thus adequately controlling for other factors driving construction should give us a 
rough estimate of the average effect of pre-development land tax on housing starts in the 
period of the study. The results may not be universal since the magnitude of the effect 
of pre-development tax depends (non-monotonously) on RKt which cannot be measured. 
The effect of other taxes on housing starts cannot be estimated reliably since the sign of 
the effect depends on RKt. In fact, one may argue, based on the theoretical model, that 
property taxes do not have universal average partial effects, distinct from market 
conditions, on construction activity that could be estimated empirically. This complexity 
of the effects of property taxes on construction activity has not been adequately 
recognized in the existing empirical literature. 
The model presented in this section is a partial equilibrium model. It gives the effect of 
property taxes on housing starts in a case where tax is levied only on one parcel of land 
and on buildings erected on that parcel. The ideal data would be site-level panel data as 
in Zax and Skidmore [19]. Alas, site-level data is not available, and thus we have to 
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content ourselves with municipality-level data. Nevertheless, we think that the model 
provides a useful basis for setting up an empirical model utilizing municipality-level 
data for housing starts, tax variables and covariates, and for interpreting the results. 
2.4 Empirical model 
The appropriate modelling framework for municipality-level housing starts data is count 
data analysis because housing starts are intrinsically discrete and because there is a 
significant number of zero observations (roughly 20 per cent in this study). A linear 
model would be problematic since it would give negative predicted values for housing 
starts (STARTS) at some values of regressors. Furthermore, the typical natural log 
transformation log(STARTS) cannot be used since it is not defined for zero observations. 
Additional transformations, such as log(STARTS+1), would be needed. With count data, 
it is better to model the conditional expectation of STARTS directly and to choose 
functional forms that ensure that STARTS is positive for any values of regressors and 
parameters. Plassmann & Tideman [11] also apply count data methods in their study of 
two-rate property taxes and building permits.  
We estimate the fixed-effects Poisson (FEP) model originally proposed by Hausman et 
al. [7], who show that if individual observations follow Poisson distribution with a mean 
(and variance) of cim(Xit, ?), then conditioning on the sum of counts across time yields a 
multinomial distribution for the vector of counts. This distribution does not depend on 
the individual heterogeneity ci. Therefore the ? parameters can be estimated by standard 
conditional MLE. The Poisson assumption that variance equals mean is very restrictive 
and seldom holds with actual data. However, Wooldridge [18] shows that the fixed-
effects Poisson estimator is consistent under much weaker assumptions. In fact, the 
conditional mean assumption 
(6) ),(),,...,|( 1 ?itiiiTiit XmccXXSTARTSE ?
is sufficient for consistent estimation of the ?  parameters. There can be over-dispersion 
or under-dispersion and there are no restrictions on the dependence between itSTARTS
and irSTARTS , rt ? . Parameter ci is a multiplicative fixed effect which captures the 
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average of STARTS over the time range and can be correlated with the explanatory 
variables X. Function m is the mean function and is given the exponential form 
)'exp(),( itit XXm ?? ? . The exponential function is convenient since the parameter 
estimates then give the semi elasticity of the dependent variable with respect to the 
independent variables (or elasticity if the explanatory variable is in logs). It is also 
intuitive to assume that the impact of the explanatory variables is proportional to 
STARTS.
A further advantage of the FEP model for the purposes of this study is that the 
dependent variable does not have to be a count. Any non-negative variable can be used 
(Wooldridge [18]). Thus the FEP model can be used for both the number of starts and 
the volume in cubic meters of buildings started. The number of starts reflects 
landowners’ choice of development timing and the volume in cubic meters of buildings 
started is thought to reflect both the timing and development density considerations of 
landowners. An alternative to direct modeling of volume would be to estimate separate 
models for the number of starts and volume per start. Modeling volume directly is 
preferable since volume per start is not defined for zero observations.19
The log-likelihood of STARTS for municipality i at time t conditional on the sum of 
STARTS over t in the same municipality is 
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The usual maximum likelihood standard errors are valid if housing starts conditional on 
explanatory variables and unobserved heterogeneity follow Poisson distribution and 
there is no dependence between itSTARTS  and irSTARTS , rt ? . Exploring the data 
suggests that there is over-dispersion and housing starts are very likely to be 
                                             
19 Plassmann & Tideman [11] estimate a count data model for the number of building permits and a 
standard linear fixed-effects model for the log of the value per permit, and calculate the effect of two-rate 
tax on the total value of permits as the sum of the two estimates. They do not specify how zero 
observations with an undefined value per permit are treated, but the reported sample sizes indicate that 
undefined observations are included in the estimations using some transformation. 
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autocorrelated since developing a site today means that it cannot be developed in the 
future. Thus the usual MLE standard errors are not valid and we use the robust variance 
covariance matrix estimator proposed by Wooldridge [18] to obtain robust standard 
errors (see also Wooldridge [17]). Earlier applications of the fixed-effects Poisson 
model that report robust standard errors include Lee & Kobayashi [8] and Page [10]. 
Plassmann & Tideman [11] also report fixed-effects Poisson estimates with robust 
standard errors. 
Since municipalities get to choose the property tax system and tax rates, the results may 
suffer from endogeneity. The choice of property tax system may be related with other 
policies affecting housing starts such as zoning and land use regulations. The fixed 
effects ci control for time-constant unobserved heterogeneity but not for changes in land 
use policy. Endogeneity of property taxes could be corrected for along the lines 
suggested by Wooldridge [20, 663-664], if valid instruments for property tax rates were 
available. In this study, variables which could be expected to have an effect on property 
tax choices but not on housing starts were not found. Endogeneity issues are discussed 
and an auxiliary model testing for the endogeneity of land use policy is estimated in the 
next section after presenting the main results. 
The FEP model is not the most efficient model if the Poisson assumption does not hold. 
However, more efficient estimation calls for more restrictive assumptions. The problem 
of overdispersion is typically addressed by assuming that the Poisson parameter follows 
gamma distribution. This assumption gives rise to the negative binomial model. 
Plassmann & Tideman [11] find the gamma assumption unappealing and assume a 
lognormally distributed Poisson parameter, which calls for some alternative to the ML 
estimation method since there is no closed form solution of the joint distribution of 
observations. In this study, the FEP model was chosen because it does not require 
specifying a distribution and because it permits direct modeling of the volume of 
buildings started. The large size of our data set permits sacrificing some of the 
asymptotic efficiency for robustness. Cameron & Trivedi [4] provide a more detailed 
discussion on panel data count models. 
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2.5 Data and empirical analysis 
Data
We use municipality-level panel data from 1998/q1 – 2006/q3 in our empirical analysis. 
After dropping a few municipalities with missing data and municipalities that merged 
with another municipality in the time period studied we end up with a balanced panel of 
391 municipalities observed in 35 quarters, which further reduces to 379 municipalities 
in fixed-effects Poisson estimations as the 12 Helsinki region municipalities with an 
imposed three-rate system are dropped. The number of municipalities with a three-rate 
system in at least one year in the period 2001–2007 is 118. Total number of 
municipalities in 2007 was 416. Data on housing starts (monthly), population (yearly), 
dwelling stock (yearly) and housing prices (quarterly) were collected from the ALTIKA 
data base provided by Statistics Finland. These data were augmented with property tax 
rates provided by the Association of Finnish Local and Regional Authorities 
(Kuntaliitto). Housing price indices are at the municipality level for 33 cities and towns 
for which such indices are available. For the remaining municipalities, province-level 
housing price indices are used. Housing starts were originally monthly, but they were 
aggregated to quarterly level since other variables are quarterly or yearly. 
Compared to the data used in Plassmann & Tideman [11], the quality of the Finnish data 
used in this study is high. Instead of building permits, we have data on actual housing 
starts which measure construction activity more accurately than permits since obtaining 
a permit does not necessarily mean that construction is started. The sample size 
contributing to the estimates of interest is much larger in this study. We have 4130 
observations (118 municipalities and 35 quarters) contributing to the estimates of the 
effect of pre-development tax on construction. In Plassmann & Tideman [11] the 
number of observations contributing to their estimate of interest is only 330 or less since 
there are only 15 two-rate municipalities and the data is annual for 22 years. Unlike this 
study, they do not have information on tax rates but only on the difference between land 
tax and building tax. Furthermore, a fixed-effects approach is more justified in this 
study since the time span of the data in this study is only eight years, compared with 22 
years in Plassmann & Tideman [11]. They are also forced to restrict their analysis to 
cities with shrinking populations because, in their sample, all the municipalities that 
39
adopted two-rate tax were “under economic distress” and were experiencing a 
population decrease. This restricts the generality of their results. Under a two-rate tax 
system with residual site value as the tax base, the effect of land tax on construction 
activity depends on market conditions and may be close to zero if returns on new 
housing investment are relatively stable over time (Turnbull [16]). 
Descriptive analysis
Tables A1 and A2 in the appendix report summary statistics of all the variables used in 
the econometric estimations separately for municipalities that had adopted the three-rate 
system by 2007 and for all municipalities. Three-rate and two-rate municipalities do not 
seem to be very different in terms of average property tax rates, housing prices or 
dwelling stock per capita. The correlation matrices of the variables used in the 
regressions are reported in Table A3 of the appendix. There do not seem to be severe 
multicollinearity problems. 
Next, time series of housing starts are examined in order to get a preliminary view of 
the impact of three-rate taxation on housing starts. The focus is on single-family 
housing starts since the impact of three-rate taxation and its time pattern are more 
pronounced for single-family starts than for all housing starts, which include more 
projects not affected by the pre-development tax.20 Table 2 compares time series for 
single-family housing starts (number of dwellings) in municipalities that stayed in the 
two-rate system with municipalities that adopted the three-rate property tax system in 
different years during the period 2001 – 2007.
Table 2 suggests that three-rate taxation leads to more single-family housing starts. The 
effect seems to be particularly strong in the new three-rate municipalities of 2003 and 
2004. Furthermore, the coming switch to the three-rate system seems to increase starts 
already in the preceding year in most cases. Accordingly, the econometric model is built 
so that it allows for this anticipatory effect. The upward shift in housing starts, seen 
when a three-rate system is introduced, may naturally be due to other factors affecting 
                                             
20 In Finland, land use plans define the kind of building that can be built on each site, and thus it is not 
possible for multi-dwelling starts to be substituted with single-family housing starts. 
40
housing starts, such as housing prices. In the econometric model, we control not only 
for property taxes but also for some other municipality attributes thought to affect 
housing starts. Note that the fixed-effects Poisson estimates of the effects of property 
taxes are based on variation within municipalities, not between municipalities. 
Table 2. Single family housing starts in three-rate and two-rate municipalities*
(second quarter of the year) 
1998/
q2
1999/
q2
2000/
q2
2001/
q2
2002/
q2
2003/
q2
2004/
q2
2005/
q2
2006/
q2
Two-rate 
municipalities 100 117.7 106.4 91.0 91.4 106.3 116.3 134.7 120.6 
Three-rate tax 
adopted in 2001 100 111.1 124.0 93.6 101.1 102.7 137.6 149.0 124.0
Three-rate tax 
adopted in 2002 100 122.6 95.5 74.2 94.6 100.9 123.1 137.6 113.6
Three-rate tax 
adopted in 2003 100 125.0 124.1 100.9 92.9 116.1 134.8 191.1 204.5
Three-rate tax 
adopted in 2004 100 114.1 112.6 84.4 71.4 129.1 145.7 158.8 144.2
Three-rate tax 
adopted in 2005 100 101.2 75.8 86.3 80.1 78.3 129.8 110.6 111.8
Three-rate tax 
adopted in 2006 100 109.4 101.3 88.1 82.7 111.0 97.7 92.2 93.3
Three-rate tax 
adopted in 2006 
(12 Helsinki 
region 
municipalities 
excluded) 100 97.2 80.6 66.7 58.7 86.1 96.5 110.1 126.0
Three-rate tax 
adopted in 2007 100 106.5 88.7 90.9 94.6 101.6 140.9 112.9 121.0 
*Colored cells indicate quarters in which the three-rate system is in effect. 
Rows 7 and 8 of Table 2 show the time series for housing starts in the new three-rate 
municipalities of 2006 with and without the 12 imposed three-rate municipalities in the 
Helsinki region. Three-rate taxation seems to have the desired effect when the 12 
municipalities are excluded but not when they are included. One possible explanation is 
that the imposition of three-rate taxation was only decided on in the fall of 2005, leaving 
developers very little time to react. The effect of three-rate taxation may also be weaker 
in the Helsinki area because concessions were made for some lots (see Section 2). 
Furthermore, the figures may reflect the scarcity of vacant land zoned for single-family 
housing in the booming Helsinki area. The 12 imposed three-rate municipalities are not 
included in the econometric analysis. 
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Econometric estimations
The econometric models have two aims: 1) to estimate the effect of property taxes on 
the number of housing starts, which reflects the development timing considerations of 
individual landowners; 2) to estimate the effect of property taxes on the volume (in 
cubic meters) of started buildings, which is thought to reflect the joint effect of timing 
and development density considerations. The volume of started buildings in cubic 
meters is used to measure the joint effect of the intensity of construction activity and 
development density, even though volume is not directly compatible with capital used 
in construction, which is the landowner’s decision variable in the theory part. Thus, the 
analysis of development density in the empirical part differs somewhat from the theory 
part. Volume is used since data on the value of housing construction are not available.21
Differences in the coefficients of tax variables for the number of started dwellings and 
for volume give some indication of how taxes affect the density of development.  
The tax rate relevant to construction decisions is the effective tax rate, i.e. the ratio of 
tax liabilities to the market value of the property. However, because of the lack of data 
on the taxable values of properties relative to market values, the effective tax rate 
cannot be measured accurately. Statutory tax rates are used instead. The ratio of taxable 
value to market value is likely to be lower in areas where housing prices and land prices 
have grown faster because the assessment regulations allow concessions when prices 
are rising. Thus the measurement error between statutory and effective tax rates is likely 
to be correlated with a major determinant of housing construction. Therefore, property 
taxes are included in the model in two different ways. The effect of property taxation is 
estimated first by means of a dummy variable indicating whether the municipality has a 
three-rate or two-rate tax system and then by using a complete set of tax rates. The 
three-rate dummy model does not suffer from measurement errors in tax rates but it 
gives a less detailed view of the effects of property taxes than the tax rate models. 
                                             
21 Nor do we have information on lot sizes, which would make it possible to measure density as volume 
per unit of land. 
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Table 3 reports the results of fixed-effects Poisson regressions of single-family housing 
starts on a three-rate regime dummy variable and the control variables. The three-rate 
regime dummy is given a value of one if the municipality has a three-rate property tax 
system and also in the year preceding the introduction of the system since there is 
typically a one year transition period. The coefficients are semi-elasticities, or 
elasticities if the explanatory variable is in logs. The reported standard errors are robust. 
The results are consistent with the theory. According to the results, adopting the three-
rate tax system increases single-family housing starts measured as the number of 
dwellings by 9.4 per cent per unit of time. The coefficient is significant at the 5 per cent 
level. The effect on volume is roughly the same, indicating that the density of 
development is not affected by three-rate taxation. Land use restrictions may play a role 
here. If the optimal density is above the limit of the town plan, density is not affected by 
three-rate taxation.  
Table 3. FE-Poisson results with a tax system dummy (single-family housing 
starts) 
Dep. var. number of dwellings Dep. var. cubic meters 
 Coef. Std. Err. P-value Coef. Std. Err. P-value
Dummy(three-rate 
system) 0.094 0.041 0.021 0.091 0.038 0.017
ln(housing price) 0.776 0.299 0.009 0.710 0.276 0.010
ln(housing stock/ 
population) -1.344 0.466 0.004 -1.003 0.447 0.025
Time dummies yes yes  
    
Log-likelihood -28227   -6966245   
     
Observations 13265     13265     
Housing price has a positive effect on starts since higher housing prices make 
development more lucrative. The price elasticity of housing starts varies from 0.71 to 
0.77. The ratio of dwelling stock to population is thought to capture the scarcity of 
housing not necessarily reflected in housing prices. The elasticity of housing starts with 
respect to dwellings per capita is negative as expected and varies from -1 to -1.3. The 
explanatory variables also include 34 quarterly time dummies capturing the effect of 
nationwide factors, such as interest rates and common business cycle effects (and 
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expectations regarding them). The quarterly dummies also control for seasonal 
variation, which is quite strong because of the northern climate. 
Table 4 reports the results of the regressions of single-family housing starts on property 
tax rates and the control variables. The effect of pre-development tax is modeled 
through the difference between pre- and post-development tax (general property tax) 
since no value can be assigned to the pre-development tax rate under a two-rate system. 
The tax rate difference is given a value of zero under the two-rate system and a positive 
value under the three-rate system. In order to take into account the effect of the typical 
one-year transition period between the decision to switch to a three-rate system and its 
actual introduction, the following year’s tax rate difference is used in the year preceding 
the introduction of the system. The general property tax represents the post-
development land tax for three-rate municipalities and the uniform land tax for two-rate 
municipalities. According to the theory section, the general property tax ought to be 
neutral in both cases.
The estimated effect of a one percentage point increase in the difference between pre-
development land tax and post-development land tax on starts measured as dwellings is 
5 per cent and significant. The general property tax has a positive sign but the 
coefficient is insignificant. This is in line with the theoretical result that development 
should not be affected by the level of land taxation. Since the tax base is independent of 
landowners’ actions, only the difference between pre-development tax and post-
development tax matters. Also building tax is positive but insignificant.  In the right 
panel, where volume in cubic meters is the dependent variable, the estimates are 
roughly the same as in the left panel, suggesting that property taxes do not affect the 
size of new single-family units. The effect of the tax rate difference can be estimated 
more accurately than the effects of building tax and general property tax, since there is 
more within variation in the tax rate difference than in the two latter tax rates (see Table 
A2 in the appendix). 
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Table 4. FE-Poisson results with tax rates (single-family housing starts)  
Dep. var. number of 
dwellings Dep. var. cubic meters 
 Coef. Std. Err. P-value Coef. Std. Err. P-value
Pre-development –  
post-development tax % 0.049 0.020 0.016 0.051 0.019 0.007
Building tax % 0.211 0.386 0.584 0.118 0.358 0.743
General property tax % 0.071 0.182 0.697 0.033 0.172 0.850
ln(housing price) 0.766 0.303 0.011 0.700 0.275 0.011
ln(housing stock/population) -1.350 0.466 0.004 -0.996 0.445 0.025
Time dummies yes yes  
Log-likelihood -28225   -6964362   
       
Observations 13265     13265     
The estimations were run also for multi unit housing starts. None of the tax variables 
was significant. The reason may be that single-family housing starts are more likely to 
be market-driven and more affected by land taxes than multi unit housing starts, which 
include social housing built with government subsidized loans. Apartment blocks and 
row houses are also more often built on lots rented by the municipality, in which case 
the developer does not pay land taxes. It is not possible to separate market-driven starts 
from government subsidized starts. Single-family units are built by private households 
or construction firms and they are more often on owned lots than larger units. 
Time pattern of the effect of three-rate taxation
The time pattern of the effect of three-rate taxation is of interest since the initial effect 
may be different from the longer-term effect. One would expect the initial shock to be 
strong and then to weaken over time as the stock of vacant land decreases over time due 
to faster development. Due to the lack of data, land stock was not included in the set of 
control variables. 
In Table 5, the time pattern of the effect of three-rate taxation on single-family housing 
starts (dwellings) is explored by estimating a model with separate dummy variables for 
the year preceding the introduction of the three-rate system and for six years after the 
introduction. The coefficient of the three-rate dummy varies from roughly 9 per cent to 
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11 per cent from the year prior to the introduction until the fourth year after introduction 
and seems to diminish thereafter. The control variables again have the expected signs. 
Table 5. Time pattern of the effect of three-rate taxation on single-family 
housing starts 
Dep. var. number of 
dwellings 
 Coef. Std. Err. P-value
Year before 0.086 0.041 0.036
1st year 0.110 0.050 0.028
2nd year 0.090 0.057 0.116
3rd year 0.093 0.054 0.086
4th year 0.107 0.071 0.136
5th year 0.077 0.110 0.483
6th year 0.051 0.081 0.531
ln(housing price) 1.201 0.301 0.011
ln(housing stock/ 
population) -2.188 0.469 0.004
Time dummies yes
    
Log-likelihood -28224   
    
Observations 13265     
Endogeneity issues
The data used in this study do not come from a natural experiment since municipalities 
get to choose the tax system and the tax rates applied in their particular municipality. 
Hence it may be that the perceived positive effect of three-rate taxation on housing 
starts is partly attributable to other policy measures taken simultaneously with the 
introduction of the three-rate system. Apart from property taxes, the main instrument 
through which a municipality can affect housing construction is zoning. The 
municipality has a zoning monopoly over all land within its borders. New residential 
land comes to the market mainly through the municipality. Typically, the municipality 
buys raw land from private landowners or from the government, then the municipality 
draws up a plan for the purchased area and sells or rents the lots to households or 
developer firms. The municipality has the responsibility to provide infrastructure for the 
zoned area. Alternatively, the municipality can make a land use contract with a 
landowner (typically a large developer) owning raw land. Land use contracts typically 
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obligate the landowner to build infrastructure in the area in exchange for zoning. The 
former alternative is far more common. 
It may be that in conjunction with the introduction of the three-rate system, the 
municipality changes its zoning policy. It is ambiguous a priori whether a three-rate 
system can be expected to be accompanied by more or less zoning. Three-rate taxation 
may form part of an expansive land use policy, which could include increasing the 
supply of residential land through increased zoning and land sales. On the other hand, 
the municipality might use three-rate taxation as an instrument to get existing zoned 
residential areas fully developed, and hence existing infrastructure more efficiently 
utilized. A policy of getting existing areas developed may be reinforced by refraining 
from zoning new areas. 
Being able to control for the stock of vacant residential land zoned for different types of 
housing could solve the potential endogeneity problem related to simultaneous changes 
in zoning policy and property taxation. Alas, land stock data are not available. However, 
the relation between the choice of property tax system and zoning can be examined 
indirectly by utilizing land transaction data. 
Annual municipality-level data on transactions of single-family housing lots are 
available for the period 2002–2005.22 Table 6 reports the results of fixed-effects Poisson 
regression of the number of single family lots sold by the municipality on the three-rate 
system indicator and three year dummies. Year 2002 is the reference year. The sample 
size is much smaller than when studying housing starts since the dependent variable is 
annual and available only for four years. Because of missing observations, the cross-
sectional sample size also declined from 118 to 111. Only three-rate municipalities are 
included in the data. 
The first three columns show the results obtained with data including all three-rate 
municipalities. The coefficient of the three-rate dummy indicates a 15 per cent increase 
in the number of lots sold by the municipality as the three-rate system is introduced, but 
the coefficient is not significant. Exploring the data revealed that the coefficient was 
                                             
22 The data are provided by the National Land Survey Authority of Finland (Maanmittauslaitos).
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strongly driven by one municipality (city of Turku), which adopted the three-rate system 
in 2003 and sold over 130 lots in the same year. In the other years in the data, the 
number of lots sold by the city varied from 10 to 30. The three last columns report the 
results when the influential outlier is dropped from the data. The coefficient of the 
three-rate dummy is now zero. 
Table 6. FE-Poisson results for the linkage between property tax system and 
land sales. 
Dep. var. 
single-family 
lots sold by the 
municipality All three-rate municipalities One influential outlier excluded 
 Coef. Std. Err. P-value Coef.
Std.
Err. P-value
Dummy (three-
rate) 0.150 0.191 0.433 0.001 0.148 0.995 
2003 -0.375 0.132 0.005 -0.393 0.132 0.003 
2004 -0.025 0.126 0.845 -0.127 0.089 0.153 
2005 -0.137 0.096 0.153 -0.129 0.098 0.188 
       
Log-likelihood -1100.8   -1026.3   
       
Observations 448     444     
Table 6 does not support the hypothesis that the choice of property tax system is 
strongly linked with more expansive zoning policy. Even if the insignificance of the 
results is partly driven by the small sample size, the results support the view that the 
observed positive effect of three-rate taxation on housing starts is indeed a causal effect 
of the tax system.  
A survey conducted by the Ministry of the Environment and the Association of Finnish 
Local and Regional Authorities provides some additional evidence that the tax system 
indeed has a causal effect. The survey asked representatives of 41 three-rate 
municipalities whether development of lots affected by pre-development land tax had 
increased. In total, 66 per cent of respondents said that development had increased.  
The above regression studied only one source of endogeneity. Other potential sources of 
endogeneity remain. Moreover, it has to be kept in mind that the results for the effect of 
three-rate taxation cannot necessarily be generalized to apply to all municipalities since 
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the choice of the tax system may be related to the unobserved potential effect of 
introducing the three-rate system. For example, municipalities that adopted the three-
rate system voluntarily may differ from the other municipalities in whether renting or 
selling lots is the primary method of bringing zoned land to the market. Some 
municipalities rent lots to developers instead of selling them. The developer does not 
pay property taxes on rented lots, and therefore development projects on rented lots 
should not be directly affected by changes in property tax rates on land. The data do not 
include information on the proportion of rented lots. Thus the effects of property taxes 
on land are estimated for a municipality with an average proportion of rented lots 
among three-rate municipalities. 
Overall effect of three-rate taxation
In order to evaluate the overall significance of three-rate taxation for housing 
construction in Finland, estimates of the average effect of three-rate taxation from Table 
3 are utilized to calculate estimates of the total effect in 2005.
Table 7 reports the estimated total effect of three-rate taxation in terms of the number of 
single family units and their volume (in 1000 m3). It is seen that the impact of three-rate 
taxation on total housing construction is relatively small. Three-rate taxation led to 350 
additional single-family housing starts (dwellings) in 2005, which corresponds to a two 
per cent increase in total single-family housing construction. In terms of volume, the 
total effect was 199,000 cubic meters.  
Table 7. Total effect of three-rate taxation in 2005. 
    Obs. 
Total
starts 
Average
effect % 
Total
effect 
(starts) 
Dwellings All municipalities 414 14912   
Three-rate 
municipalities 82 4111 9.4 354
Volume (1000 cubic 
meters) All municipalities 414 8810   
Three-rate 
municipalities 82 2390 9.1 199
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2.6 Conclusions
This paper builds a theoretical model of the impact of Finnish type three-rate property 
taxation on landowners’ development decisions and estimates the effect of property 
taxes on construction activity using Finnish data. The discussion following the 
theoretical model in Section 2.3 underlines the potential difficulties in estimating the 
effects of property taxes on construction activity. According to the theoretical model, 
the effects of property taxes on the timing and density of development depend crucially 
on future returns on housing investment, which are difficult if not impossible to 
measure. This complexity of the effects of property taxes on development has not been 
adequately acknowledged in earlier empirical studies. However, the effect of the 
Finnish-type tax on undeveloped land can be estimated more reliably than the effects of 
uniform land tax and building tax because the qualitative effect of the pre-development 
land tax on timing does not depend on market conditions. 
The results of the fixed-effects Poisson estimations suggest that taxing undeveloped 
land at a higher rate than developed land has the desired positive effect on single-family 
housing starts. The initial effect is strong but the results give some indication that the 
effect weakens after a couple of years. The impact of three-rate taxation on the volume 
of single-family housing starts is the same as on the number of dwellings, indicating 
that the density of development is not affected.  
The theoretical analysis also showed that the general property tax rate, which is applied 
to all zoned land in the two-rate system and to developed land in the three-rate system, 
does not affect landowners timing and density decisions. The empirical results support 
this finding.
The lack of data on the stock of land zoned for different uses reduces the reliability of 
the empirical results. As a robustness check the simultaneity of changes in land use 
policy and property taxation was studied by estimating a model where single-family 
housing lots sold by the municipality were regressed on a tax system indicator. The 
effect of the tax system was insignificant, supporting the view that the econometric 
models identify the causal effects of property taxation. 
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Appendix
Table A1. Descriptive statistics: all municipalities 
Variable   Mean
Std.
Dev. Min Max Observations
Single family housing starts 
(dwellings) overall 5.8 11.2 0 196 N =   13265 
between  8.5 0.2 76.1 n =     379 
within  7.3 -59.3 125.7 T =      35 
Single family housing starts  
(cubic meters) overall 3343 6522 0 112993 N =   13265 
between  4965 74 42801 n =     379 
within  4236 -35073 73534 T =      35 
Dummy (three-rate) overall 0.152 0.359 0 1 N =   13265 
between  0.266 0 0.771 n =     379 
within  0.242 -0.619 1.067 T =      35 
Pre-development % –  
post-development land tax % overall 0.22 0.60 0 2.78 N =   13265 
between  0.44 0 1.95 n =     379 
within  0.41 -1.73 2.76 T =      35 
Building tax % overall 0.27 0.06 0.1 0.5 N =   13265 
between  0.05 0.19 0.40 n =     379 
within  0.04 0.10 0.49 T =      35 
General property tax % overall 0.60 0.15 0.2 1 N =   13265 
between  0.12 0.43 0.98 n =     379 
within  0.08 0.24 1.06 T =      35 
Housing price index (y2000=100) overall 105.0 10.6 79.8 147.5 N =   13265 
between  2.4 99.7 110.4 n =     379 
within  10.4 74.9 142.6 T =      35 
Dwellings/population overall 0.456 0.050 0.216 0.829 N =   13265 
between  0.044 0.307 0.595 n =     379 
within   0.024 0.240 0.807 T =      35 
Min and Max within refer to deviations from each municipality’s average. 
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Table A2. Descriptive statistics: municipalities that adopted three-rate system in 
2001–2007
Variable   Mean
Std.
Dev. Min Max Observations
Single-family housing starts 
(dwellings) overall 8.6 13.5 0 117 N =    4130 
between  9.7 0.3 45.7 n =     118 
within  9.5 -29.0 84.9 T =      35 
Single-family housing starts 
(cubic meters) overall 4973 7932 0 72485 N =    4130 
between  5728 202 26263 n =     118 
within  5511 -18116 54783 T =      35 
Dummy (three-rate) overall 0.489 0.500 0 1 N =    4130 
between  0.250 0.086 0.771 n =     118 
within  0.434 -0.282 1.404 T =      35 
Pre-development % –  
post-development land tax % overall 0.71 0.90 0 2.78 N =    4130 
between  0.52 0.056 1.95 n =     118 
within  0.74 -1.25 3.25 T =      35 
Building tax % overall 0.27 0.06 0.1 0.45 N =    4130 
between  0.05 0.19 0.39 n =     118 
within  0.04 0.12 0.41 T =      35 
General property tax % overall 0.62 0.15 0.2 1 N =    4130 
between  0.12 0.43 0.95 n =     118 
within  0.08 0.27 0.88 T =      35 
Housing price index 
(y2000=100) overall 104.7 10.2 81.0 142.9 N =    4130 
between  2.3 99.7 110.4 n =     118 
within  9.9 77.6 139.5 T =      35 
Dwellings/population overall 0.450 0.052 0.216 0.647 N =    4130 
between  0.046 0.346 0.559 n =     118 
within   0.023 0.234 0.571 T =      35 
Min and Max within refer to deviations from each municipality’s average. 
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1
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3 Rent control and tenants’ welfare: The effects of 
deregulating rental markets in Finland 
3.1 Introduction
Rent control and price controls in general reduce the supply of the good by squeezing 
suppliers’ profits. The social cost of price controls is typically thought to be the amount 
of consumer’s and producer’s surplus lost due to reduced supply. However, price 
controls may lead to additional welfare losses by increasing discrepancies between 
actual and desired levels of consumption of the good. The welfare costs from 
misallocation of housing may be even higher than the undersupply costs and should be 
taken into account when evaluating rent control programs (Glaeser and Luttmer, 2003).  
A household that has managed to obtain a rent controlled dwelling benefits from rent 
control in the form of low rent, but may also suffer a welfare loss (disequilibrium cost) 
because the adjustment of housing consumption to changes in income, household size 
and other factors is more difficult under rent control than in its absence. Empirical 
studies on the costs and benefits of rent control to tenants routinely assume that a 
household always consumes on its demand curve in the absence of rent control but not 
under rent control. Several papers have estimated costs and benefits of rent control to 
tenants based on this assumption. However, as e.g. Turner and Malpezzi (2003) note, 
because moving and transaction costs also exist in uncontrolled markets, the question is 
not whether disequilibrium costs exist under rent control but rather whether they are 
greater than in the absence of rent control.  
This paper analyses the effect of rent control without using the assumption of 
instantaneous perfect optimization in the uncontrolled market. The theoretical part of 
the paper shows that the assumption of no disequilibrium in uncontrolled markets 
causes the net benefit of rent control to tenants to be underestimated, and derives 
welfare measures that also allow for disequilibrium in consumption in the free market 
case.
The focus of this study is on the costs of rent control to tenants occupying rent 
controlled dwellings. The analysis is partial concentrating only on the demand side. 
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Welfare cost of reduced supply, which is generally thought to be the main component of 
the dead weight losses of rent control, is beyond the scope of the paper.
There are various possible reasons for wider discrepancies between actual and utility 
maximizing housing consumption under rent control than without it. From a search 
theoretical point of view, it can be argued that, because of the excess demand situation 
in the controlled market, a household searching for a rent controlled dwelling receives 
fewer offers per time unit than in the absence of rent control. Since finding a suitable 
unit takes more time, the household tolerates wider discrepancies between actual and 
desired housing consumption before starting the costly search for a new unit and accepts 
worse matches when searching. Loikkanen (1982) derives these results from an explicit 
search-theoretical model. Also other studies use similar search theoretic arguments for 
the existence of disequilibrium in housing consumption under rent control (e.g. 
Malpezzi, 1998; Glaeser and Luttmer, 2003; Malpezzi and Turner, 2003). Glaeser and 
Luttmer (2003) refer to the same phenomenon as misallocation of housing under rent 
control. They argue that if rent controls are binding, there are more consumers willing to 
rent at the prevailing rent level than there are dwellings available, and the price 
mechanism is substituted by alternative allocation mechanisms, such as queuing or a 
lottery. If the alternative mechanisms taking the place of prices fail to allocate dwellings 
to those with highest valuations, there are additional welfare losses because households 
and dwellings are not as well matched as they could be.  
Glaeser and Luttmer (2003) find that dwellings and households are significantly worse 
matched in rent controlled New York City than in free-market places. Their method is 
based on differences in the overlap of housing demand distributions of demographic 
subgroups in controlled and uncontrolled markets. This paper incorporates the 
possibility of the increased mismatch between dwellings and households in the widely 
applied traditional welfare analysis framework and attempts to estimate the consumer’s 
surplus lost due to increased disequilibrium in consumption under rent control. The 
empirical method is based on the differences in the variation around the estimated 
individual housing demand curves between rent controlled and free market samples. 
The empirical application utilizes Finnish household level data before and after the 
abolition of rent control in 1995. The empirical application suffers from low quality of 
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the data available and the results rest on several possibly unrealistic assumptions. 
However, the results are in line with Glaeser and Luttmer (2003) and suggest that rent 
control leads to significant welfare losses by distorting consumption patterns of those 
who are able to attain a controlled dwelling.  
Early studies of costs and benefits of rent control to tenants use Marshallian welfare 
measures to estimate the effect of rent control on consumers’ surplus. One of the first 
empirical studies on welfare effects of rent control is Olsen (1972) who derives and 
applies a Marshallian measure of rent control benefit to tenants. The welfare measure is 
based on a model which allows disequilibrium costs under rent control but assumes 
perfect instantaneous optimization in the uncontrolled market. Olsen’s model has been 
used later by Malpezzi (1993), for instance. More recent studies have often preferred 
Hicksian welfare measures that allow for income effects of price changes. Ault and 
Saba (1990) derive Hicksian measures of rent control benefit to tenants assuming no 
disequilibrium in consumption in the uncontrolled market. Early (2000) uses a similar 
model as Ault and Saba (1990) but relaxes the assumption that rents in the uncontrolled 
sector are unaffected by rent control. The assumption of no disequilibrium in the 
absence of rent control is still maintained. Malpezzi (1998) has a focus on the effect of 
side payments on tenants’ welfare under rent control, but he also reports Hicksian 
estimates of welfare costs of rationing the household to consume a fixed amount of 
housing. Malpezzi (1998) applies Schwab’s (1985) model which was developed to 
analyse welfare effects of government programs that offer certain goods at below 
market prices but also ration the amount consumed of that good. Also Schwab’s model 
assumes consumption on the estimated demand curve in the absence of rent control. 
Turner and Malpezzi (2003) provide a more extensive survey of empirical studies of 
costs and benefits of rent control. Although the assumption of perfect instantaneous 
optimization is dropped in this study, the theoretical framework follows closely the 
traditional line of welfare analyses of rent control. Several complicating elements, such 
as the possibility that landlords have market power, are neglected in this study. Arnott 
(1995) summarizes critique on traditional analysis of rent control and surveys modern 
theories of rent control that take into account various market imperfections and model 
many aspects of “second generation” rent control systems.  
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The rest of this study is organized as follows. Section 3.2 provides a brief history of rent 
control in Finland and describes developments in rent level and tenure structure in 
Finland. Section 3.3 presents the theoretical framework of the study and derives welfare 
measures used in the empirical part. Section 3.4 presents the empirical procedure of the 
study. Section 3.5 reports the estimates of the net benefit of rent control to tenants and 
its components and evaluates the robustness of the results. Section 3.6 concludes. 
3.2 A brief history and descriptive analysis of rent control in Finland 
A brief history of Rent Control in Finland 
The following description of the rent control system draws on Ralli (2005) and Bengs & 
Loikkanen (1991).
Rent control was introduced in Finland during the Second World War and retained until 
1961, when the wartime rent control was abolished. However, only seven years later, in 
1968, rent control was reintroduced as rents in buildings built before the end of 1968 
were frozen as a part of a stabilization policy package related to the devaluation of the 
Finnish markka in 1967. Landlords reacted to the newly imposed rent control by 
increasingly giving notice and converting rental dwellings to owner-occupied dwellings. 
To prevent evictions, interim regulation protecting tenants against notice were 
introduced in 1969. The protection was transferred to an Act in 1970.
The period of tenancy rent control ended in 1974 when a new rent control system was 
introduced. The old system allowed rents to be set freely when a dwelling was rented 
for the first time, but no rent rises were allowed thereafter. Under the new system, the 
government annually made decisions on the maximum acceptable rents and rent rises 
for different types of dwellings. These controls applied to all private rental dwellings 
and were based on proposals of a board with tenant and landlord representatives. The 
acceptable rents and rent rises depended on the age of the house, the size of the 
dwelling, house type, and city size. The ten biggest cities had special housing courts that 
handled disputes on rents. The original plan was that rent increases would reflect 
changes in running and maintenance costs, but in practice the average rent level fell in 
real terms in many years (see Graph 1). In 1987, after twelve years of preparation, the 
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rent control system was slightly modified to allow a reasonable profit to landlords, and 
real rents started to rise.
In 1991, the abolition of rent control was included in the program of the first 
conservative government in twenty-five years. The motivation was to bring more rental 
apartments onto the market and to enhance the adjustment of the labor market to the big 
depression of the early 1990s. The share of private sector rental dwellings in the 
housing stock had declined from 33 per cent in 1970 to 12 per cent in 1990 (see Table 
1).
The deregulation of private rental markets occurred in two phases.23 In the first phase of 
the reform at the end of 1992, new tenancies were deregulated, and in the second phase 
in 1995, existing tenancies were also deregulated and landlords were allowed to set 
rents freely. Together with the abolition of rent control, eviction laws were also relaxed, 
and the current Finnish tenancy law is among the most liberal in Europe. Before the 
reform, landlords were allowed to give notice only on very good grounds, e.g. unpaid 
rent or disturbance to neighbors, and the eviction still took a lot of time. Nowadays, 
giving notice is relatively easy. For example, sale of the dwelling or the tenant’s 
reluctance to pay higher rent are valid reasons. Notice has to be given six months before 
the termination date if the tenancy has lasted over one year and three months before the 
termination date otherwise. Tenants have to give notice one month prior to the 
termination date. Fixed-term contracts are more difficult to terminate. Although 
landlords are allowed to unilaterally increase rents, tenancy agreements typically tie rent 
rises to the cost of living index. 
What happened when rent control was abolished? 
Graph 1 shows the development of the average real rent per square meter in all rental 
dwellings (including social housing) from 1963 to 2004, and the average real rent in the 
private rental sector during the period 1974–2004 for the whole country and from 1990–
                                             
23 Rent control, in the form of cost-based rents, still exists in public rental housing built with the support 
of government-subsidised loans (ARAVA), which are mainly granted to municipalities and non-profit 
organisations. Public rental housing is allocated on social criteria and there are rules regarding 
spaciousness etc. 
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2004 for the Helsinki Metropolitan Area (HMA). The average rent declined in real 
terms from the introduction of rent control in 1968 to 1979, apart from 1974, when the 
system was modified. After 1979, the average real rent remained quite stable until 1987, 
when the rent control system was modified to allow slightly higher rent increases. From 
1988 onwards, the rent level has risen and the average real rent per square meter in 
private rental dwellings was 57 per cent (71 per cent in HMA) higher in 2004 than in 
1990. It seems that the average rent reacted with a one- or two-year lag to the two 
phases of deregulation in 1992 and 1995. The sluggish reaction of the rent level to the 
reform can be explained by the severe depression at the beginning of the 1990s. The 
depression probably dampened the immediate reactions of landlords because demand 
was weak, and because the depression resulted in a situation where large amounts of 
unsold owner-occupied dwellings were rented. The deregulation of financial markets in 
the mid-1980s had led to a housing boom which was followed by a bust in the early 
1990s, leaving many households and investors with unsold dwellings. Graph 1 shows 
that real rents started to rise more quickly as demand recovered towards the end of the 
decade. A report by Statistics Finland shows that in 1992, when new tenancies were 
freed from rent control, the difference in average rent per square meter in new tenancies 
and in the whole stock widened to 25–35 per cent, depending on the size of the 
dwelling. Before the reform, the respective difference was 10–20 per cent. These 
developments lend support to the idea that rent control was indeed binding in a 
substantial part of the housing stock, at least at the beginning of the 1990s. 
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Graph 1. Average real rent per square meter from 1963–2004 (in 2003 €, not controlled 
for dwelling characteristics). 
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Table 1 shows the number of private rental dwellings and their share of the whole 
dwelling stock in 1970, 1990, 1995, 2000, and 2003. The number of private rental 
dwellings decreased from 1970 to 1990, when rent control was in effect, by almost 50 
percent. On the contrary, from 1990 to 1995 the number of private rental dwellings 
increased by almost 50 per cent and has remained at a higher level thereafter. Part of the 
rapid increase in the number of private rental dwellings after 1990 may be explained by 
definition changes in the housing stock statistics collected by Statistics Finland. 
Nevertheless, the figures reported in Table 1 provide strong evidence that the controls 
were binding and resulted in a considerable under-supply of private rental housing. 
Table 1. Private rental dwelling stock. 
  1970 1990 1995 2000 2003 
Private rental dwellings 478500 271465 401275 391189 449521 
Share of the whole stock % 32.5 12.3 17 16.2 17.3 
Source: Statistics Finland 
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In addition to the deregulation of rental markets, there are many other factors 
contributing to the changes in the tenure type distribution. The 1990s was a turbulent 
period in the Finnish economy, and alongside with the abolition of rent control various 
other reforms and institutional changes affecting the housing market also took place. 
These changes include introducing the dual income tax system in 1993, EU membership 
in 1995, and EMU membership in 1999. Lower interest rates and better availability of 
mortgage loans with a long maturity at the end of the 1990s and early 2000 made 
owner-occupied housing available for more households. Together with the abolition of 
rent control, eviction laws were also loosened, which made the conversion of rental 
units to owner-occupied units easier and made private rental housing less attractive for 
long-term tenants by reducing tenant security.24
3.3 Constructing welfare measures 
As a starting point for the derivation of formulas for the costs and benefits of rent 
control to tenants, housing is defined as a one-dimensional flow of housing services 
arising from various characteristics of the dwelling. Treating housing as a one-
dimensional index of dwelling characteristics is convenient since it allows the modeling 
of housing decisions in a two-commodity, housing and non-housing, framework. 
Hedonic techniques can be used to estimate the quantity of housing services provided 
by each dwelling and the price per unit of housing services paid by the tenant residing in 
that dwelling.  
Figure 1 illustrates the theoretical framework of this study. The figure depicts a 
household that has income Y and consumes two goods, housing service (volume H,
price P) and non-housing goods (volume X, price normalized to 1). In the absence of 
rent control, the household faces the budget line with slope -Pm and under rent control 
                                             
24 In Finland, the bulk of private rental dwellings are rented condominiums owned by individual 
investors, largely households, who are not as reliable landlords as institutional investors. The risk of being 
evicted by an individual investor is high, because they often have shorter planned holding periods than 
institutional investors.  
62
the budget line with slope -Pc.25 It is assumed that in both cases the price of housing is 
fixed for the particular household. Disequilibrium in housing consumption is defined as 
the difference between equilibrium consumption, at the tangency point of the budget 
line and the indifference curve, and actual housing consumption.  
Figure 1.
If the household could perfectly optimize both under rent control and in the absence of 
rent control, the benefit of rent control to the household would be the difference of 
utility levels U1 and U4
(1) NB* = U4 – U1,
                                             
25Frankena (1975) notes that rent control does not necessarily lead to lower price per unit of housing 
service because the landlord can downgrade the amount of housing services produced by the dwelling by 
neglecting maintenance. However, the development of rent level and tenure structure presented in Section 
3.2 give strong evidence that rent control was binding in Finland in 1990.  
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which could be measured in terms of Hicks compensating or equivalent variation of the 
price change from Pm to Pc or as the change in Marshallian consumer’s surplus when the 
household moves along the demand for housing curve from Pm to Pc.
However, a key feature of the housing market is that searching for a new dwelling and 
moving is costly (in terms of money and time), and thus, the household may consume 
significantly out of equilibrium. The magnitude of the discrepancy between actual and 
desired housing consumption that the household tolerates before moving is positively 
dependent on the search and moving costs. The excess demand situation caused by 
binding rent control leads to higher expected search costs because the arrival rate of 
offers is lower than in the absence of rent control. Therefore, the disequilibrium costs 
should be on average higher under rent control than in the absence of rent control. 
(Loikkanen, 1982.) Since moving and search costs also exist in uncontrolled markets, 
our measure of the net benefit of rent control to a tenant also allows for disequilibrium 
in consumption in the absence of rent control.
The household depicted in the figure consumes under rent control at point B, where its 
housing consumption is lower than the optimal consumption at price Pc. Under-
consumption of housing is typical of rent controlled markets, but over-consumption is 
also possible. In the absence of rent control, the household consumes at point A where,
in this case, housing consumption is higher than the utility maximizing housing 
consumption. The net benefit of rent control to the particular household, taking into 
account disequilibrium in consumption, is given as 
(2) NB = U2 – U0,
which may be higher or lower than NB* depending on whether the utility loss due to 
disequilibrium in consumption is higher or lower under rent control than in the absence 
of rent control. In his study on the New York City rental markets, Early (2000) 
constrained the net benefit of rent control to be positive because otherwise the tenant 
would move to an uncontrolled unit. This study also allows negative net benefits 
because no uncontrolled rental sector coexisted in Finland in 1990 and access to other 
housing sectors was also limited. Public rental housing was allocated on social criteria, 
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and in the owner-occupied housing sector households faced extensive savings 
requirements to obtain personal non-assignable housing loans.
The disequilibrium cost under rent control is the utility loss of consuming bundle B
instead of the optimal bundle at the tangency point of U4 and the upper budget line 
(3) DECOSTc = U4 – U2.
Respectively, the disequilibrium cost in the absence of rent control is given as 
(4) DECOSTm = U1 – U0.
From the figure and equations (1) – (4), it is seen that the net benefit of rent control can 
be decomposed as 
(5) NB = NB* + DECOSTm – DECOSTc.
Existing studies on the welfare effects of rent control omit the second component by 
assuming perfect instantaneous optimisation in the uncontrolled market, and thus 
underestimate the net benefit (e.g. Olsen 1972; Ault et al. 1990; Malpezzi 1993; Early 
2000). The difference between total DECOSTc and DECOSTm gives an estimate of the 
welfare losses for tenants due to increased discrepancies between actual and desired 
housing consumption caused by the increased difficulty of finding suitable dwellings 
under rent control. 
However, estimating DECOSTm requires estimating the market price in the controlled 
sector in the absence of rent control, which is often problematic. In this study, data on a 
parallel uncontrolled rental sector is not available and estimates of Pm are based on 
rather arbitrary assumptions on the development of market rent level over time. 
Therefore, we propose a decomposition of DECOSTc, which permits estimating the 
additional disequilibrium costs attributable to rent control without knowledge on Pm.
DECOSTc is decomposed further into two components: 1) the “natural” disequilibrium 
cost (NDECOSTc) in the hypothetical case where the price of housing is Pc, but the 
household is able to optimize as well as in the absence of rent control, i.e. the 
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conditional disequilibrium distribution is the same as in the absence of rent control; and 
2) the additional disequilibrium cost (ADECOSTc) attributable to rent control.  
(6) DECOSTc = NDECOSTc + ADECOSTc.
In the empirical application, the estimation of DECOSTm and NDECOSTc is based on 
simulated variation around individual demand for housing curves. For households in the 
rent controlled sample only point B in the figure is observed. Estimates of DECOSTm
are based on simulating point A in the figure by taking the predicted housing 
consumption at price Pm and adding a random draw from the residual distribution of the 
housing demand equation. Similarly, estimates of NDECOSTc are based on simulation 
of housing consumption in the case where the price of housing is Pc and the variation 
around the equilibrium housing consumption corresponds to free market variation (point 
C in Figure 1).
In the figure, point C represents the “natural” disequilibrium case. The point is drawn so 
that ADECOSTc is positive. In the empirical application the estimated ADECOSTc may 
be negative for some households, but positive values are more common.  
 For the household in the figure 
(7) NDECOSTc = U4 – U3 and 
(8) ADECOSTc = U3 – U2.
Now, plugging (6) into (5) gives our final decomposition of tenant benefits 
(9) NB = NB* + DECOSTm – (NDECOSTc + ADECOSTc).
Section 3.5 reports estimates of average and total values of all the components of (9), 
the ratio of the components of NB to consumption expenditure is also reported. The 
difference between DECOSTc and DECOSTm and the additional disequilibrium cost 
ADECOSTc are particularly interesting because they give two alternative estimates of 
the welfare costs of rent control to tenants.
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Next we derive Marshallian measures for the four components of the net benefit of rent 
control to a tenant household.  Marshallian consumers’ surplus approximates the utility 
differences by areas constrained by the demand for housing curve. The derivation of 
more exact Hicksian welfare measures is discussed briefly after Marshallian measures. 
Only Marshallian estimates are reported in this study. 
Marshallian welfare measures 
The Marshallian consumer’s surplus measures are only approximations of the welfare 
effects of rent control because the income effect of the price change is neglected. Willig 
(1976) derives bounds on the percentage errors of approximating the Hicksian 
compensating and equivalent variations with the consumer’s surplus and shows that in 
most applications the error will be very small. Furthermore, the approximation error 
positively depends on the local income elasticity. Our estimate of the income elasticity 
of rental housing demand is roughly 0.2, and thus the approximation error is likely to be 
very small in this study. 
Figure 2 illustrates the calculation of Marshallian measures of the net benefit of rent 
control and its components to a tenant household. The model closely resembles Olsen’s 
(1972) model with the exception that the assumption of perfect optimization in the 
absence of rent control is relaxed. Furthermore, Olsen’s assumption of unit elastic 
demand is relaxed and individual demand curves are estimated from micro data. In the 
figure, D is the demand for housing service curve of the household. Under rent control, 
the household faces price Pc. With that price, the household would like to consume H*c
units of housing, but it actually resides in a dwelling that produces Hc units of housing 
(cf. point B in Figure 1). Hc’ represents the “natural” disequilibrium case where the 
household faces price Pc but is able to optimize as well as in the absence of rent control 
(cf. point C in Figure 1). In the absence of rent control, the household would face price 
Pm. With this price, it would like to consume H*m units of housing but actually 
consumes Hm units (cf. point A in Figure 1).  
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Figure 2. 
The consumer’s surplus (CS) extracted from an arbitrary amount of housing services H~
is the area under the inverted demand curve D and left of H~ less housing 
expenditure HP ~ .
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The CS measures are operationalized by assuming that the individual demand for 
housing function takes the form 
(11) )ln()ln('ln 210 YdPdCdH ??? ,
where P is price of housing, Y is income, and C is a vector of indicators for household 
characteristics. The corresponding inverted demand function is 
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where 120 /1' ))/(1( ddCd YeA ? . With this demand function, the components of NB in (5) can 
be written in terms of prices, quantities and demand parameters as 
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If reliable estimates of Pm in the rent controlled market are available, comparing 
DECOSTc and DECOSTm gives a good estimate of the welfare costs of wider 
discrepancy between actual and desired housing consumption under rent control. The 
alternative measure for additional disequilibrium costs due to rent 
control )( cADECOST , that does not require knowledge on Pm in controlled case, is 
obtained by calculating natural disequilibrium cost under rent control as 
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and then plugging cDECOST  and cNDECOST  in (5) and solving for cADECOST
(17) ccc NDECOSTDECOSTADECOST ?? .
Equations (13) – (17) are used to calculate the estimates of costs and benefits of rent 
control to private rental sector tenants in 1990. It is seen that the calculation requires 
information on the price of housing paid by the household in controlled and 
uncontrolled rental markets, demand parameters, and housing consumption in five 
cases; 1) actual housing consumption (Hc) under rent control, 2) equilibrium housing 
consumption (H*c) under rent control, 3) housing consumption (Hc’) at the controlled 
price in the case where variation around the desired consumption corresponds to the 
“natural” variation in the uncontrolled market, 4) equilibrium housing consumption 
(H*m) in the absence of rent control, and 5) housing consumption (Hm) in the absence of 
rent control. The actual housing consumption (Hc) under rent control is observed for 
each household, but H*m, Hm, H*c and Hc’ are unobserved and therefore have to be 
69
estimated. Estimates for H*m and H*c are obtained as predictions from a housing demand 
model and estimates for Hm and Hc’ are obtained by generating variation around the 
predicted demands. The next section discusses the estimation of the price and quantity 
of housing, reports estimates of the demand parameters, and presents the methods used 
to generate the unobservable housing consumptions.  
Hicksian welfare measures 
Hicksian estimates of the benefit of rent control in the no-disequilibrium case (NB*)
could be calculated simply as the compensating or equivalent variation of the price 
change from Pm to Pc. The calculation would only require the estimation of an ordinary 
demand equation and the derivation of the implied indirect utility and expenditure 
functions (Hausman, 1981). The minimum expenditure required to reach utility 
extracted from a sub-optimal consumption bundle cannot be directly calculated by 
inserting values of indirect utility and price in the expenditure function. Applying 
Hausman’s (1981) method in this study would require calculating shadow prices and 
incomes for the suboptimal bundles numerically. Alternatively to Hausman’s (1981) 
method, a specific functional form could be given to the direct utility function U(H,X).
A commonly used utility function is the Stone-Geary function, which has been used in 
housing related studies by Kim et al. (2004), Early (2000), Ault et al. (1990), and 
Loikkanen (1988), among others. This study uses only Marshallian measures for the 
costs and benefits of rent control since they do not require restrictive assumptions on the 
form of the utility function and are computationally simpler than applying Hausman’s 
(1981) method. 
3.4 Empirical implementation 
Data used 
Data used in this study are drawn from the Household Expenditure Survey from 1990, 
1995, 1998 and 2001, collected by Statistics Finland. The data are repeated cross-
sections. Annual total sample sizes vary around 9 000 households. The data include 
information on household characteristics, housing tenure, rent paid and some dwelling 
attributes. Alas, dwelling quality or location in the housing market area are not included. 
70
All the monetary variables are repriced to a common base of 2001 using the consumer 
price index. The size of sub-samples containing only tenants in private rental dwellings 
is annually about 500–700, but it reduces to 400–600 as we drop households living in 
rural municipalities and some outliers with unrealistic values for relevant variables. 
Households living in rural municipalities are dropped because there are no well-
functioning rental markets in most of the rural municipalities, which would make the 
measurement of the price and quantity variables highly unreliable. The share of private 
sector tenants in the sample is lower than in the population, since the sampling design is 
such that higher income households, who are also more often owner occupiers, are over-
sampled. Sampling weights are not used in the demand for housing regressions or in the 
hedonic regressions, but results reported in Section 3.5 are made representative of the 
population by using sampling weights. 
Estimates for the costs and benefits of rent control are calculated from the 1990 data. 
Years 1998 and 2001 serve benchmarks representing the uncontrolled situation. Year 
1998 is used as the benchmark when estimating price and quantity of housing and year 
2001 when estimating housing demand parameters. As a robustness check, costs and 
benefits of rent control are calculated as if rent control was still in effect in 2001, 1998, 
and 1995. 
Price and quantity of housing 
The first step of the empirical implementation of the welfare measures is to estimate the 
price (P) and quantity (H) of housing services, which are needed both in the estimation 
of housing demand parameters and when calculating NB and its components. A 
common approach to estimate the price and quantity of housing is to use the hedonic 
technique.26 This study also uses hedonic regression. The method used here follows 
closely Malpezzi (1998) with the exception that our data covers multiple housing 
markets whereas he used data from one city only (Cairo). The idea of the method is to 
use a hedonic index as a predictor for housing services and interpret the unexplained 
variation in rents as price differences. Thus, the price of housing services is allowed to 
                                             
26 Zabel (2004) provides a discussion on the measurement of price and quantity of housing services. 
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vary within housing market areas, not only between markets. Because the data used in 
this study lack information on location attributes and the quality of the dwelling, price 
estimates also reflect important omitted variables and the amount of variation in prices 
is overstated. These measurement errors pass through the whole empirical procedure 
and cast some doubt on the final results.  
It is very likely that the Finnish rent control system distorted the hedonic prices of 
attributes since the acceptable rent increases depended on dwelling characteristics, and 
thus, the controlled rents did not necessarily reflect the amount of housing services. 
Therefore, it is assumed that without rent control the hedonic equation apart from 
intersect would have been the same in the other years as in 1998, which is the first 
uncontrolled year in our data set. For the purposes of the robustness check, estimates for 
price and quantity are calculated for all the four datasets, not only for the benchmark 
year and rent control year. 
In order to calculate the actual price and quantity of housing consumed for each private 
sector tenant household in the four datasets, we use a sample of private rental sector 
tenants in the benchmark year 1998 and estimate the hedonic model 
(18) ??? ??? GZR ''ln , 
where R is the annual gross rent paid by the household and Z is the physical 
characteristics of their dwelling, such as floor area, the number of rooms, the age of the 
house, and house type. G is a group of indicators for geographical areas. Helsinki 
metropolitan area is the reference area. It is assumed that similar dwellings in different 
areas produce the same amount of housing service. Thus, the geographical dummies 
control for regional variation in prices, not in housing quantity. 
The exponentiated prediction from the hedonic (18) when the geographical indicators 
are set to zero is used as a measure for quantity of housing services. This effectively 
means that the price of housing services in a dwelling with rent predicted by the model 
and located in Helsinki Metropolitan Area (HMA) is normalized to unity. Then, making 
use of the fact that R = P*H, the predicted rent (excluding G) can be used as a measure 
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of the quantity of housing services for each household in our four cross-sectional data 
sets.
(19) )'ˆexp( ZH ?? .   
Thus, the amount of housing services produced by each dwelling is defined as the 
estimated conditional median rent for a similar dwelling in the benchmark year in 
HMA.27
The price per unit of housing services can now be calculated for each household by 
dividing the actual rent paid by that household by the imputed amount of housing 
services
(20)
)'ˆexp( Z
R
H
RP
?
?? .
With this price definition, both differences in rent levels across market areas and 
unexplained differences within market areas across different locations are reflected in 
the price estimate for each unit. It is assumed that the hedonic model is detailed enough 
to separate price from quantity sufficiently well. The equations (19) and (20) are used to 
calculate estimates of price and quantity for all the households in the four data sets. The 
2001 data will be later used in the demand estimation. These estimates are used as 
estimates of Pc and Hc in equations (13)–(17) when calculating estimates of NB and its 
components for the 1990 sample, and also for 1995, 1998 and 2001 when evaluating the 
robustness of the welfare estimates.   
Having estimated the actual housing consumption and the price of housing services for 
each household, the next step is to calculate the hypothetical price of housing in the 
absence of rent control (Pm).
                                             
27 If ln(R) is conditionally normally distributed with mean a’Z and variance ?2, then exp(a’Z) is the 
conditional median of R and the conditional mean is exp(a’Z+?2/2) (See e.g. Goldberger, 1968). In our 
application the variance of the residual distribution was 0.068. Thus, the median is probably only about 3 
percent lower than the mean. 
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Studies of costs and benefits of rent control typically use a coexisting uncontrolled 
rental sector as a benchmark when estimating market rents for rent controlled units. 
Since no identifiable uncontrolled rental sector coexisted in Finland in 1990, the closest 
possible post rent control year (year 1998) is used as benchmark, i.e. we assume that in 
the absence of rent control, rents would have been on the 1998 level in real terms in 
1990. This is a rather arbitrary assumption, but note from equation (13) – (17) that the 
estimation of disequilibrium costs caused by rent control measured as ADECOSTc does 
not hinge on assumptions on the market price in 1990. The estimates of the components 
of NB that include Pm may be unreliable because of this assumption but we report 
estimates of all the components of NB in order to illustrate the method. Note that the use 
of a coexisting uncontrolled housing sector as a benchmark is also problematic because 
rent control may affect the price of housing in the uncontrolled sector (Early, 2000).  
Of the supply side factors affecting rent levels in uncontrolled markets real housing 
prices were roughly 20 percent higher in 1990 than in 1998 and also interest rates were 
higher. However, there are reasons to believe that the high housing prices in 1990 were 
caused by a speculative bubble. On the demand side, tenants’ real income level was 
roughly equal in 1990 and in 1998 (see Table A1 in the appendix). Based on these 
figures, it is difficult to asses if the 1998 rent level understates or overstates market rent 
level in 1990. 
The prediction of the model (18) for a household in 1990 data gives an estimate of the 
actual rent paid by the household for the dwelling they occupy, if the price of housing in 
that area were on the 1998 level. The market price (Pm) of each unit is calculated by 
dividing the predicted rent from model by the quantity of housing services estimate 
from model (18).  
To sum up, the results of hedonic regressions of (18) are used to obtain estimates for 
housing consumption under rent control )'ˆexp( ZH c ?? , controlled price 
)'ˆexp(/ ZRPc ??  and market price )'ˆexp(/)'ˆ'ˆexp( ZGZPm ??? ?? . Estimating the 
rest of the variables in (13) – (17) requires estimating a demand for housing equation, 
which also applies the price and quantity measures defined above. 
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Table 2 shows the results for the hedonic model (18). A semi-log model was found to fit 
the data best. The R-squared is 0.61.28 The inclusion of second order terms produces a 
negative joint effect of floor area at sufficiently large floor areas. The effect of floor 
area on rent turns from positive to negative at around 125 square meters. Only 2 percent 
of observations are located beyond this point. Also the effects of the number of rooms 
and age switch sign. Rents are higher in HMA than in the rest of the areas. 
Table 2. Results of the hedonic regression, dep. var. ln(rent), 1998 data. 
  Coef Std. Err. 
Floor area (m2) 0.025 0.004
Floor area sqr. /100 -0.010 0.002
Number of rooms -0.109 0.056
Number of rooms sqr. 0.017 0.008
Age of the house -0.010 0.002
Age of the house sqr./100 0.007 0.003
House type (ref. Single family detachted house) 
Two family detached 
house -0.071 0.082
Row house 0.090 0.075
Apartment block 0.203 0.066
Other 0.044 0.149
Area (ref. Helsinki Metropolitan Area) 
Area 2 -0.322 0.036
Area 3 -0.305 0.065
Area 4 -0.246 0.043
Area 5 -0.415 0.074
Area 6 -0.230 0.050
Area 7 -0.400 0.092
Constant 7.760 0.120
R-squared 0.605  
N 450   
Area2 = Urban municipalities, Southern Finland  
Area3 = Densely populated municipalities, Southern Finland 
Area4 = Urban municipalities, Central Finland 
Area5 = Densely populated municipalities, Central Finland  
Area6 = Urban municipalities, Northern Finland 
Area7 = Densely populated municipalities, Northern Finland  
                                             
28 The hedonic models perform relatively well even though the data are not very detailed. For instance, in 
Malpezzi (1998) the R-squared of the hedonic model is 0.581.
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Housing demand estimation
The next step of the empirical procedure is to estimate the parameters of the demand for 
housing function. Post rent control data rather than 1990 data is used in the demand 
estimation because if rent control distorts consumption patterns, those distortions might 
be reflected in the estimates of demand parameters obtained with the 1990 data. Of the 
two post rent control data sets the 2001 data was chosen because it gave a better fit and 
more plausible demand estimates than the 1998 data. This suggests that the transition to 
the uncontrolled situation was maybe not yet over in 1998. The 2001 data should give 
us consistent estimates of the underlying behavioral parameters, provided that the 
demand model is correctly specified. We assume that these parameters do not change 
over time, and hence, can be used for households in the 1990 sample. 
Because the estimated demand model is also used in the simulation of Hm and Hc’, we 
are interested, not only in the demand parameters, but also in the residual distribution. 
Therefore, the variance of the error distribution is modeled through a multiplicative 
heteroskedasticity term. The multiplicative heteroskedasticity model was introduced by 
Harvey (1976), and Weesie (1998) provides a Stata program for estimating the model 
by the maximum likelihood method. The model is written as  
(21) ?????? YdPdCdH lnln'ln 210
)'exp( 10
2 Dkk ??? ,
and is estimated with the 2001 data. In the demand equation, H denotes the estimated 
amount of housing services consumed, P denotes the estimated price of housing 
services, Y denotes the total consumption expenditure, and C is a vector of other 
household characteristics. Consumption expenditure was chosen as the income variable 
because it is generally thought to represent the relevant longer term income concept 
affecting housing consumption better than disposable income (Olsen, 1987). The error 
term is the product of a standard normal distributed random variable ?  and a 
heteroskedasticity term ? . The square of the heteroskedasticity term is a function of a 
group of household size indicators D (D is a subset of C). Also other covariates were 
tested in the variance equation, but they turned out to be insignificant. The 
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exponentiated prediction from model (21) with controlled price is used as an estimate of 
H*c. Respectively, the predicted demand with market price gives an estimate of H*m.29
The results of ML estimation of the model (21) with 2001 data are reported in Table 3. 
The estimated income elasticity of demand for housing is 0.19 and the price elasticity is 
-0.34. Measurement error in housing price causes the estimate of the price elasticity of 
housing demand to be biased downwards, but we use these estimates because no better 
estimates for rental housing demand with Finnish data from the uncontrolled period are 
available. Household size has a positive effect on housing consumption. Also the effect 
of age is positive. Female-headed households consume more housing than male-headed 
households. According to the results of the variance equation the percentage deviation 
from the predicted housing demand seems to depend negatively on household size. The 
residual distribution seemed to be approximately normal. The explanatory power of the 
model is high (R-squared 0.67). Table A1 in the appendix reports descriptive statistics 
for the variables of the demand model in all four years of data (no sampling weights 
used).
Table 4 describes the estimated disequilibrium in housing consumption in 1990–2001. 
The table suggests that there was significant under-consumption of housing under rent 
control in 1990. The mean deviation from the predicted housing consumption was about 
-13 per cent in 1990. Already in 1995, when the final phase of deregulation took place, 
the mean disequilibrium was practically zero. 
                                             
29 The exponentiated prediction of the log-linear demand equation is a predictor of the conditional median 
of H (see footnote 27 above). The variance of the error distribution for a one person household is 0.037, 
and thus, the conditional median is at most only about 2 percent below the conditional mean. 
77
Table 3. Results of the demand for housing model with multiplicative heteroskedasticity, 
2001 data. 
  Demand equation Variance equation 
 Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. 
ln(consumption 
expenditure) 0.194 0.022   
ln(price) -0.338 0.035   
Household size (ref. 1 person) 
2 persons 0.216 0.023 -0.251 0.150
3 persons 0.312 0.032 -0.392 0.232
4 persons 0.423 0.042 -0.261 0.295
>4 persons 0.453 0.047 -0.945 0.482
Age of household head (ref. < 25 years) 
26-35 years 0.055 0.023   
36-45 years 0.056 0.029   
46-55 years 0.151 0.027   
56-65 years 0.101 0.038   
> 65 years 0.192 0.044   
Female hh head (ref. 
male) 0.045 0.017   
Constant 6.393 0.214 -3.295 0.101
VWLS R2 0.671    
Log Likelihood 138.2    
N 445       
Table 4. Disequilibrium in housing consumption, benchmark year 2001. 
ln(actual housing consumption) –  
ln(predicted housing consumption) 
Year Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
1990 552 -0.126 0.256 -0.917 0.515
1995 585 -0.004 0.212 -0.893 0.687
1998 438 -0.011 0.214 -0.786 0.611
2001 449 -0.001 0.179 -0.688 0.452
Simulation
Estimates of the demand function and residual distribution are now used to simulate 
unobservable housing consumptions mH  and 'cH  for the rent controlled sample.
30 The 
simulated housing consumption in the free market case ( mH ) for each tenant in the 
1990 sample is obtained by taking the predicted log of housing consumption with 
                                             
30 Based on their ordered probit demand estimates for demand for rooms, Glaeser and Luttmer (2003) use 
a similar method to predict the efficient allocation of housing in the rent controlled sector of New York 
City.
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observed household characteristics and price of housing Pm, adding a random draw from 
the conditional residual distribution, and then exponentiating to obtain mH .
(22) ?? ˆˆlnˆlnˆ'ˆln 210 ????? YdPdCdH mm
)'ˆˆexp(ˆ 10
2 Dkk ???
The simulated residuals are obtained by drawing a N(0,1) distributed random number ?ˆ
which is then multiplied by the predicted heteroskedasticity term ?ˆ . Respectively, the 
simulated housing consumption with the controlled price and free market residual 
variance ( 'cH ) is the predicted housing consumption with the observed household 
characteristics and price Pc plus the simulated residual. 
(23) ?? ˆˆlnˆlnˆ'ˆ'ln 210 ????? YdPdCdH cc
)'ˆˆexp(ˆ 10
2 Dkk ??? .
In order to eliminate random variation in the results stemming from drawings from the 
residual distribution, the simulation procedure is repeated 100 times and estimates for 
the components of net benefit are calculated after each round for each household in the 
data. The average over the 100 rounds is then used for each household when calculating 
the sample mean and total of NB and its components.  
Discussion on the empirical procedure 
The limitations of the data cause the measurement of the price and quantity of housing 
to be inaccurate. These inaccuracies pass through the whole empirical procedure and 
cast doubt on the final results. Also the assumption of stability of the hedonic equation 
(apart from intersect) and the demand equation may be unrealistic. Thus, the results 
should not be considered as exact estimates of costs and benefits of rent control to 
tenants but rather as suggestive evidence on whether rent control leads to higher 
disequilibrium costs. 
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Gleaser and Luttmer (2003) use bootstrapping methods in order to derive standard 
errors for their estimates of the amount of misallocation of housing (number of rooms). 
Their procedure also takes into account sampling error in their ordered probit demand 
estimates. The statistical properties of the welfare measures used here are not studied in 
this paper. Further work should be done on this issue. 
In our empirical procedure all of the deviation from the fitted demand curve is 
interpreted as disequilibrium, which is clearly an over simplification. Households 
consume off the estimated demand curve also because of heterogeneous preferences, 
misspecifications and measurement errors in the demand model, and statistical 
estimation error. Since the results are reported as averages and totals, this source of 
error is likely to be unimportant. The fact that the fit of the estimated demand equation 
is never perfect is an additional reason why deviations from the demand curve should be 
allowed for also in the absence of rent control. Assuming that households consume on 
the estimated demand curve in the uncontrolled market but not under rent control means 
that all of the unexplained variation in housing consumption is counted as 
disequilibrium caused by rent control. 
An additional potential source of error in the demand regression, and in the subsequent 
analysis, is that the model does not take into account the Finnish housing allowance 
system. Low income households and students may have up to 80 per cent of their rent 
compensated, causing the income variable to be endogenously determined for some 
households. Here it is argued that this is not a major problem, since there is a tight upper 
threshold for the compensable rent, which is binding for most recipients. After the 
ceiling is met, small changes in housing consumption do not affect income. Loikkanen 
(1988) provided evidence that the impact of housing allowance on housing consumption 
is small, which suggests that treating housing allowance as pure income supplement 
may be a valid simplification. In this study, housing allowance is treated as any other 
income in the demand regression, and the possible impact of higher rents on housing 
allowance is ignored when calculating the costs and benefits of rent control.
It is important to note that together with the abolition of rent control, eviction laws were 
also relaxed (see Section 3.2). The changes in eviction laws may have affected the 
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distribution of disequilibrium in housing consumption through its effect on moving. 
Hence, besides the phase out of rent control, the results of this study may also reflect 
changes in tenant security. Theoretical evidence is mixed. Loikkanen (1982) shows that 
an increased probability of being evicted widens the equilibrium sets of housing 
consumption because the expected discounted disutility of current disequilibrium 
depends negatively on the probability of being evicted. By contrast, Nordvik (2001) 
finds that as the probability of being forced to move increases, the willingness to accept 
mismatch in housing consumption, in order to avoid moving costs, decreases. Edin and 
Englund (1991) provide empirical evidence that in Sweden the absolute values of the 
residuals of a housing demand model fall with duration in the present dwelling. This 
suggests that reduced tenant security is likely to increase the variance of residual 
distribution of the housing demand model. Thus, the change in the eviction law 
probably worked in the opposite direction to the abolition of rent control and may have 
caused the estimated additional disequilibrium costs (ADECOSTc) to be lower and the 
estimated net benefit (NB) to be higher than if the eviction law had remained 
unchanged.
3.5 Results
Table 5 reports the main results of this study. Estimates of the net benefit of rent control 
to tenants and its components are calculated for the 1990 sample using formulas given 
in equations (13)–(17). Table A2 in the appendix summarizes the various price and 
quantity measures appearing in the equations. The estimates of NB, NB* and DECOSTm
should be interpreted even more cautiously than the rest of the components since they 
rely on the assumption that in the absence of rent control real rents would have been on 
the benchmark year level in 1990. The estimates of disequilibrium costs under rent 
control (DECOSTc, ADECOSTc and NDECOSTc) do not hinge on this assumption, 
because market price Pm does not appear in the formulas for these components of the 
net benefit.
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Table 5. Net benefit of rent control to tenants and its components, year 1990. 
Mean
(EUR)* 
Total
(EUR 
million)*
Share of 
consumption 
expenditure 
%
Net Benefit (NB) 1087 205 5.8
Equilibrium benefit (NB*) 1329 250 7.1
DECOSTm 208 39 1.1
DECOSTc 449 85 2.4
ADECOSTc 284 54 1.5
NDECOSTc 165 31 0.9
Starting from the bottom, Table 5 suggests that additional disequilibrium costs due to 
rent control (ADECOSTc) made up a major part of disequilibrium costs under rent 
control (DECOSTc). Mean DECOSTc was 449 euro and mean ADECOSTc was 284 euro. 
The ratio of total ADECOSTc to total consumption expenditure was 1.5 percent. 
Estimated disequilibrium costs in the free market case DECOSTm are somewhat higher 
than natural disequilibrium costs NDECOSTc. Thus, the difference between 
disequilibrium costs in the controlled case and uncontrolled case (DECOSTc – 
DECOSTm) gives a slightly lower estimate of the disequilibrium costs caused by rent 
control than the decomposition of DECOSTc to natural disequilibrium costs and 
additional disequilibrium costs. Mean DECOSTc – DECOSTm is 241 euro.
The results regarding disequilibrium costs suggest that rent control leads to significant 
welfare losses by distorting consumption patterns in the controlled market. These 
disequilibrium costs should be taken into account, alongside with undersupply costs, 
when evaluating rent control programs. A methodologically important observation is 
that the commonly used measure of welfare costs of rent control to tenants, DECOSTc,
grossly overestimates disequilibrium costs caused by rent control. In our application the 
share of DECOSTc attributable to rent control was 63 per cent. This result highlights the 
importance of relaxing the assumption of perfect instantaneous optimization by 
households in the absence of rent control. 
The estimates of net benefit of rent control to tenants (NB) and equilibrium benefit 
(NB*), hinge on the assumption that market rents would have been on the 1998 level in 
the absence of rent control. They are reported, nevertheless, in order to illustrate the 
potential downward bias to net benefit estimates from assuming no disequilibrium in 
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deregulated markets. Mean net benefit is 1087 euro. If disequilibrium costs in the free 
market case (DECOSTm) were neglected and net benefit were calculated as                 
NB = NB* – DECOSTc, mean net benefit would be under estimated by about 20 percent.  
Note that positive NB cannot be interpreted as a net benefit for the whole economy. It is 
paid by the owners of controlled dwellings. Studies of welfare effects of rent control 
often report estimates of transfer efficiency which is calculated as the ratio of the net 
benefit to tenants residing in controlled units to the costs of lower rents to the landlords 
of those units, NB/[(Pm – Pc)Hc] (see e.g. Olsen, 1972 and Ault and Saba, 1990). Our 
estimate of transfer efficiency is 0.84. Also these estimates are possibly unreliable 
because the estimates of market rents in 1990 may be erroneous.  
Robustness check 
As a robustness check, the same method that was used to obtain the results reported in 
Table 5 was also applied to 1995, 1998, and 2001 data, as if rent control was still in 
effect in these years. Table 6 reports the total net benefit and its components as 
percentage of total consumption expenditure of tenants in these years.  
Table 6. Robustness check. 
  Share of consumption expenditure % 
  1990 1995 1998 2001
Net Benefit (NB) 5.81 0.60 -0.97 -3.33
Equilibrium benefit 
(NB*) 7.08 1.31 -0.46 -3.16
DECOSTm 1.11 1.16 1.07 1.04
DECOSTc 2.39 1.88 1.57 1.20
ADECOST 1.52 0.76 0.49 0.06
NDECOST 0.88 1.12 1.08 1.14
Theoretically, ADECOSTc should be zero after the phasing out of rent control in 1998 
and 2001. However, the estimates of ADECOSTc in the benchmark years 1998 and 2001 
differ from zero because of error stemming from the simulation procedure and statistical 
errors in the estimates of demand parameters. From Table 6, it is seen that ADECOSTc
is positive but quite close to zero in 1998 and 2001, especially when using year 1998 as 
the benchmark. In the transition year 1995, ADECOSTc is in both panels higher than in 
1998 and 2001 but lower than in 1990. The rent control year 1990 stands out from the 
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table with notably higher ADECOSTc than in other years. The robustness check suggests 
that the estimate of ADECOSTc in 1990 is mainly driven by larger discrepancies 
between actual and desired housing consumption due to rent control and not largely 
affected by simulation error and statistical error. However, since ADECOSTc is positive 
also in the uncontrolled years when it should be zero, it may be that ADECOSTc is 
slightly overestimated in 1990. 
3.6 Conclusions
This paper derives welfare measures of costs and benefits of rent control to tenants of 
the controlled dwellings. We allow for suboptimal housing consumption not only under 
rent control but also in the uncontrolled market. Earlier empirical papers on costs and 
benefits of rent control to tenants assume that households always consume on the 
estimated demand curve in the absence of rent control. Welfare analysis of rent control 
should allow for disequilibrium in consumption also in the uncontrolled market because 
search and moving costs exist also in the absence of rent control. Another reason is that 
the fit of the housing demand model is never perfect. Assuming that households 
consume on the estimated demand curve in the uncontrolled market but not under rent 
control counts all of the unexplained variation in housing consumption as 
disequilibrium due to rent control.  
The limitations of the data cause the measurement of the price and quantity of housing 
to be inaccurate. These inaccuracies pass through the whole empirical procedure and 
cast some doubt on the empirical results. Also the assumption that the parameters of the 
hedonic equation (apart from intersect) and the demand equation do not change over 
time may be unrealistic. However, the main result that disequilibrium costs were higher 
in 1990 than in the years when rent control was not in effect is quite clear. Thus, the 
empirical findings suggest that rent control causes welfare losses that offset a significant 
part of the benefits of lower rents to tenants. Further, the results highlight the 
importance of relaxing the assumption of no disequilibrium in consumption in the 
absence of rent control. In our application, maintaining the assumption of no 
disequilibrium in uncontrolled markets would have caused the net benefit of rent control 
to tenants to be underestimated by roughly 20 per cent. 
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Appendix
Table A1. Descriptive statistics.  
Year  Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
1990 Housing services 552 5888.4 1723.2 2312.4 10729.2
 Consumption expenditure 552 20620.6 12140.5 3202.9 75037.5
 Price of housing 552 0.569 0.212 0.052 1.484
 Household size 552 1.987 1.072 1 6
 Age of household head 552 39.601 17.164 17 88
Female household head 
(1/0) 552 0.471 0.500 0 1
1995       
 Housing services 585 5839.5 1629.3 1916.6 11073.0
 Consumption expenditure 585 18655.0 9274.5 5284.9 64169.5
 Price of housing 585 0.777 0.371 0.169 6.992
 Household size 585 2.043 1.113 1 8
 Age of household head 585 35.658 14.250 18 90
Female household head 
(1/0) 585 0.446 0.498 0 1
1998       
 Housing services 438 5751.8 1713.0 2231.9 10631.0
 Consumption expenditure 438 20748.7 11448.9 4284.2 78207.8
 Price of housing 438 0.824 0.232 0.235 2.076
 Household size 438 2.002 1.109 1 7
 Age of household head 438 37.171 15.315 18 87
Female household head 
(1/0) 438 0.427 0.495 0 1
2001       
 Housing services 449 5503.9 1642.6 1994.1 10392.1
 Consumption expenditure 449 20871.4 11373.5 3358.3 72415.2
 Price of housing 449 0.904 0.262 0.108 1.978
 Household size 449 1.855 1.050 1 8
 Age of household head 449 35.167 14.769 17 85
Female household head 
(1/0) 449 0.506 0.501 0 1
Table A2. Prices and quantities of housing, year 1990. 
  Mean Median Std. Dev.
Pc 0.569 0.541 0.212
Pm 0.804 0.782 0.116
Hc 5888 5917 1723
Hc* 6574 6522 1672
Hm* 5696 5844 1313
Hc'  6667 6611 1686
Hm 5775 5897 1323
Figures for Hc' and Hm are based on the  average over 100 simulations calculated for each household.
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4 Incentive effects of the Finnish housing allowance 
system: Theory and empirical analysis 
4.1 Introduction
In most countries, governments subsidize the housing consumption of low-income 
households through various kinds of subsidy programs. The general trend has been 
toward less construction of social housing and increased reliance on direct housing 
allowances to low-income households. Housing allowance programs differ in their 
specifics and different kinds of programs give different incentives regarding 
consumption choices. This paper analyzes the effect of the Finnish housing allowance 
(HA) system on renter households’ housing choices both theoretically and empirically.  
According to the paternalistic justification for housing allowances, low-income 
households do not consume enough housing. It may be, for example, that the person 
who makes the household’s consumption decision does not take into account the wishes 
other family members. Alternatively, one may argue that housing consumption should 
be subsidized since housing is a merit good which positively affects health, schooling 
outcomes, success in the labor market etc. In this study, we show that the Finnish 
housing allowance system not only directs low-income households to consume more 
housing but also creates incentives to choose certain space-quality combinations. From 
the housing policymaker’s point of view it is important to know if households really 
react to the incentives of the HA scheme. It may be, for example, that households are 
unaware of the effect of space and quality on HA, and they choose space-quality 
combinations based on their own relative valuations without knowing that the decision 
affects their possible housing allowance. In that case, the distribution of HA involves 
randomness and the HA system can be accused of inequity. Households that just happen 
to have preferences that match the incentive structure of the HA system get the highest 
compensations. 
In the theoretical part of the paper, incentives created by the system are analyzed by 
considering the effect of being eligible for HA on the household budget constraint in a 
three-commodity framework with housing space, housing quality, and other goods 
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being the three goods. This three-dimensional framework is needed to accurately 
describe the incentive structure created by the HA system because the system sets upper 
limits to housing space and rent/square meter. A low-income household consuming 
below these ceilings gets a compensation of 80 per cent of the rent exceeding a 
deductible. If the ceilings are exceeded, the compensation is based on the ceiling value 
instead of the actual rent. The rent/square meter ceiling can be interpreted as an upper 
limit to housing quality. In the private rental market, a higher rent/square meter given 
floor area is associated with higher quality. Thus the amount of subsidy depends not 
only on the rent paid but also on the space-quality combination provided by the 
dwelling. Two similar households living in dwellings with equal rent but different 
space-quality combinations may get different amounts of subsidy.  
Decomposing the usual one-dimensional index of housing services into space and 
quality might give new insight into the incentive structures of housing subsidy programs 
also in other countries. Olsen (2001), for instance, writes that an accurate model of 
some of the U.S. housing subsidy programs should decompose housing services into 
several attributes. Furthermore, the empirical analysis in this study provides new 
information on households’ ability to act according to the incentive structures of 
complex subsidy systems. 
In the empirical part, we study several aspects of household behavior under the HA 
scheme. A descriptive analysis of the distribution of eligible and non-eligible 
households with respect to the spaciousness and quality ceilings suggests that the HA 
scheme does not affect the space-quality combinations chosen by eligible households to 
a great extent. Furthermore, we do not find evidence that the probability of moving is 
positively affected by the potential gain in HA attainable through moving. This is 
consistent with the view that households’ knowledge of the complex HA scheme is 
weak. Another possible explanation is incomplete participation in the program. We find 
that the take-up rate is roughly 65-80 per cent, and is affected e.g. by education, HA 
entitlement, and income expectations. 
The housing allowance system under consideration in this paper is the general housing 
allowance (yleinen asumistuki) financed by the government through the Social 
89
Insurance Institution of Finland (KELA). The general HA system is the most important 
tenant-based housing subsidy system in terms of the number of recipients and total 
outlays. In 2005, KELA paid 437 million euro of general housing allowances to 
155,000 households (311,000 individuals). The average monthly HA was 222 euro. 
Students and pensioners, whose subsidy systems differ from the general housing 
allowance system, are beyond the scope of this study. To simplify the analysis, this 
paper concentrates only on renter households. Owner-occupiers are ignored because 
very few of them receive housing allowances. In 2005, 95 per cent of recipient families 
were renters.  
Several studies have constructed structural econometric models of the effects of housing 
subsidy schemes on the housing choices of subsidy recipients. The general outcome of 
these studies is that subsidy systems have a very limited impact on the housing 
consumption of recipient households and housing assistance is mainly used for non-
housing consumption. Hausman and Wise (1980) propose a fairly general method of 
estimating households’ indifference mappings over housing and other goods in the case 
where only housing expenditure is observed and the household faces a convex budget 
set with kinks. Their approach cannot be used here since they assume that each 
household chooses only one quality level of housing. In the Finnish HA system, the 
amount of HA depends on housing quality, and thus housing quality cannot be treated 
as exogenous. Furthermore, the budget set is non-convex in the Finnish setting. Venti 
and Wise (1984) use a similar framework as Hausman and Wise (1980) but extend the 
analysis to include moving decisions. Koning and Ridder (1997) estimate a structural 
model of the effects of the Dutch rent assistance (RA) program. Their model takes 
account of the partial take-up of the subsidy. They find that due to the application costs 
only 60 per cent of the households entitled to RA based on their rent apply for RA. 
Koning and Ridder also treat housing as a one-dimensional good and they make several 
simplifying assumptions, including a uniform rental price of housing services across the 
Netherlands and a uniform compensation rate for housing allowance recipients. Quigley 
(1982) estimates the hedonic prices of various housing attributes and uses the variation 
in the hedonic prices to estimate households’ utility functions. He applies the results to 
analyze the effects of different housing subsidy programs.  
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In this study, the structural econometric approaches discussed above cannot be applied 
because the HA scheme is very complicated and because the data is not detailed enough 
to measure housing quality. Furthermore, we think that the model of housing 
consumption under the HA scheme should also incorporate moving and take-up 
decisions, which would complicate the model further. The approach chosen here is non-
structural and is based on descriptive analysis and reduced-form estimations. In the 
empirical part, we study separately the space-quality choices, mobility and HA take-up 
propensity of eligible households.
This study draws on Loikkanen (1988), who studies the effect of the Finnish housing 
allowance system on the demand for housing (housing space) and intra-urban mobility 
of eligible renter households. He uses stated preference data31 from 1975 to 1978 to 
identify the parameters of a Stone-Geary utility function. The results are used to 
construct disequilibrium measures based on the difference between pre-allowance actual 
dwelling sizes and desired dwelling sizes with allowances. The disequilibrium measure 
is then used as an explanatory variable in a model of the intra-urban mobility of 
households that become eligible. He finds that the effect of the HA system on desired 
dwelling sizes and on mobility is very low, and thus most households use the allowance 
for non-housing consumption and its effect on housing consumption is weak. This paper 
extends Loikkanen’s (1988) theoretical framework by considering the effect of the 
rent/square meter limit by bringing in the space-quality decomposition of housing 
services. Furthermore, it is important to study the HA system using more recent data 
because households’ possibilities to adjust housing consumption according to the 
incentives of the HA scheme may have improved since the 1970s because rent control 
of private rental dwellings was abolished in Finland in 1995. This study uses data from 
2001 to 2005.
Another branch of literature studies the effects of housing subsidies on rental prices. 
According to Susin (2002), low-quality rental prices are higher in areas with a lot of rent 
vouchers. Laferrère and Le Blanc (2004) find that rent increases are higher when new 
                                             
31 In Loikkanen’s (1988) data HA recipients were asked if they would like to move if there were different 
kind of rental units easily available and the share of their HA of the rent were unchanged. This question 
generated (hypothetical) exogenous variation in prices, which was used to identify preference parameters. 
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renters receive housing allowances. Kangasharju (2003) finds that Finnish housing 
allowance recipients pay higher rents per square meter than non-recipients and he offers 
two explanations for this: either landowners charge higher rents from HA recipients or 
recipients consume higher-quality housing. We argue that the latter explanation is more 
plausible since landlords do not know whether tenants receive HA. In this study, higher 
rent per square meter is interpreted as a sign of higher quality both for HA recipients 
and non-recipients. 
4.2 Incentive structure of the HA system 
This section describes the incentive structure created by the Finnish general housing 
allowance system by modeling the effect of being eligible for housing allowance on the 
budget set of a renter household in the simplest possible framework, in which housing is 
decomposed into space and quality.  The resulting budget constraint is non-convex with 
several segments, which are generally non-linear. Due to the complexity of the budget 
constraint and the data limitations, we are not able to derive and estimate a structural 
econometric model of the HA scheme. Nevertheless, our analysis of household 
optimization under the HA scheme serves as a useful guide for empirical work and 
should be of interest to policymakers.  
A low income household may get HA if its pre-tax income falls below a limit value 
which depends on household size and the place of residence.32 Larger households have 
higher income limits, and municipalities are grouped into three groups according to 
housing affordability so that income limits are higher in areas with higher rents.33
Households below the income limit may get 80 per cent of their housing expenditure 
exceeding a deductible (or own-risk) compensated in the form of HA. The deductible 
depends positively on pre-tax income and negatively on household size. In addition to 
                                             
32 Household financial wealth is also included in the calculation of pre-tax income using a formula. 
33 The Helsinki Metropolitan Area (HMA) forms group I with the highest income limits. Group II 
includes 26 cities and towns. Group III is the rest of Finland. In 2002, the HMA was further split into the 
city of Helsinki and the rest of the HMA. The income limits are still the same in the city of Helsinki as in 
the rest of the HMA but the rent/square meter ceilings are higher in Helsinki than in the surrounding 
areas.
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the deductible, there are two limitations on the acceptable rent on which the 
compensation is based. 1) If rent per square meter paid by the household exceeds a 
certain ceiling, the excess rent is neglected when calculating the subsidy. This 
rent/square meter ceiling will be referred to in the following as the quality ceiling since 
it effectively sets an upper limit to the acceptable quality of housing. 2) If the floor area 
of the dwelling exceeds a ceiling value, which depends positively on household size, the 
compensable rent is calculated by multiplying the rent by the ratio of the ceiling value 
to the actual floor area. The floor area ceiling will be referred to in the following as the 
spaciousness ceiling.
It is possible that a household whose income is below the eligibility limit does not 
receive HA for its dwelling. This is the case if the compensable rent is lower than the 
deductible. In what follows, we use the term eligible to denote eligibility based on 
income.  
Budget constraint with HA 
Housing demand analysis often treats housing as a one-dimensional flow of housing 
services arising from various characteristics of the dwelling, such as floor area, quality, 
distance to the city centre, local amenities, and neighborhood characteristics. It is 
typically assumed that there is a uniform market price for a unit of housing services 
within a housing market area. Treating housing as a one-dimensional index of dwelling 
characteristics is convenient since it allows the modeling of housing decisions in a two-
commodity, housing and non-housing framework. However, the Finnish housing 
allowance system cannot be modeled realistically in a two-commodity framework. 
Because the quality ceiling and the spaciousness ceiling limit the compensable rent, the 
subsidy granted to a household is a function of, among other things, rent per square 
meter and floor area. Therefore, a three-commodity model is constructed where the 
household consumes non-housing goods, housing space, and housing quality, which 
consists of all dwelling attributes other than floor area.  
The price of non-housing consumption is normalized to unity but housing attributes are 
priced jointly in the rental market. Denote by ),( 21 HHR  the hedonic rent function for a 
dwelling with space H1 and quality H2. R is assumed to be increasing in H1 and H2, but 
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no other restrictions are made for now. The hedonic function is generally non-linear and 
the exact form of it in a housing market area is determined in the interplay of 
households’ preferences and suppliers’ production functions (see e.g. Sheppard, 1999).
In the absence of HA, the household’s budget constraint is ),( 21 HHRXY ?? , where 
Y is income and X is non-housing. A household eligible for HA and operating in the 
private rental market faces the budget constraint 
(1) ),,,,),,((),( 112121 HcbaHHHRSHHRXY ??? ,
where Y is pre-subsidy disposable income. S is housing allowance (subsidy), which 
depends on rent paid, dwelling attributes, and the following parameters of the HA 
system: 
a = compensation rate (currently 0.8) 
c = deductible (depends positively on pre-tax income and negatively on 
household size, and is higher in cities with higher rents) 
b = rent/m2 ceiling or quality ceiling (depends negatively on floor area and 
positively on the year of construction) 
1H = spaciousness ceiling (depends negatively on household size) 
The compensation rate is the same for all households, but the other parameters depend 
on household characteristics, dwelling attributes, or the affordability category of the 
municipality. The quality ceiling is higher in municipalities with higher rents, and 
depends mildly negatively on dwelling size and mildly positively on the year of 
construction or the latest major renovation of the building. All parameters are treated as 
exogenous to the household, i.e. it is assumed that the subsidy parameters do not affect 
inter-urban mobility, household formation, or labor market decisions. The slight 
dependence of the rent/m2 ceiling on floor area and the age of the unit is also neglected 
in the theoretical analysis. Table A1 in the appendix reports the spaciousness ceiling for 
different household sizes. Table A2 shows the quality ceiling for the city of Helsinki for 
different construction years and floor area classes. 
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The subsidy function S can be expressed in five segments, and therefore the budget 
plane also has five segments. The segments of the budget plane are labeled A -E. 
Segment A consists of three cases where the household does not receive any subsidy 
because the compensable rent is lower than the deductible. The three no-allowance 
cases are 
0?S   if cR ?   (Segment A1) 
or cR ?  and 11 HH ?  and cRH
H
?
1
1  ( Segment A2)  
or cR ?  and bHR ?1/  and cbH ?1   (Segment A3). 
In segment A1, rent is lower than the deductible. In segment A2, the spaciousness 
ceiling is binding and the compensable rent is lower than the deductible. In segment A3, 
the quality ceiling is binding and the compensable rent is lower than the deductible. If 
the compensable rent exceeds the deductible, the household gets part of their rent 
expenditure compensated in the form of HA in the following way 
)( cRaS ??   if  11 HH ?  and bH
R ?
1
 (Segment B), 
)( 1 cbHaS ??  if  11 HH ?  and bH
R ?
1
 (Segment C), 
???
?
???
?
?? cR
H
HaS
1
1  if  11 HH ?  and bH
R ?
1
 (Segment D) and 
)( 1 cHbaS ??  if  11 HH ?  and bH
R ?
1
 (Segment E). 
In segment B, neither ceiling is binding. In segment C, the quality ceiling is binding but 
the spaciousness ceiling is not binding. In segment D, the spaciousness ceiling is 
binding but the quality ceiling is not binding. In segment E, both ceilings are binding. 
Substituting the subsidy function into the budget constraint (1) and rearranging gives 
the following budget constraint for a household eligible for HA. 
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(2) RXY ??   if cR ?   (Segment A1) 
or cR ?  and 11 HH ?  and cRH
H
?
1
1
 ( Segment A2)  
or cR ?  and bHR ?1/  and cbH ?1
 (Segment A3) 
RaXacY )1( ????  if  11 HH ?  and bH
R ?
1
 (Segment B) 
1abHRXacY ????  if  11 HH ?  and bH
R ?
1
 (Segment C) 
R
H
HaXacY ???
?
???
?
????
1
11  if  11 HH ?  and bH
R ?
1
 (Segment D) 
RXcHbaY ???? )( 1  if  11 HH ?  and bH
R ?
1
 (Segment E). 
Following Koning and Ridder (1997), we have moved the fixed components of the 
subsidy function within each segment on the left-hand sides. The left-hand sides of (2) 
can be interpreted as virtual incomes associated with the segments of the budget 
constraint.
Figure 1 illustrates the three-dimensional budget set in the case of a linear hedonic 
function 221121 ),( HPHPHHR ?? . The linear hedonic function is an extremely 
simplified example of a hedonic function and is used solely for illustrative purposes. 
The analysis does not hinge on linearity. The vertical axis is non-housing, the outer 
horizontal axis is space and the inner horizontal axis is quality. Without HA, the budget 
set would simply be a straight plane, but with HA the budget set is kinky and non-
convex with a hump in the middle where H1 and H2 are such that compensable rent 
exceeds the deductible. In segment A surrounding the hump, the eligible household is 
not entitled to HA because they occupy the wrong kind of dwelling. Close to the origin 
their rent is too low. On the sides of the hump their space-quality combination is not 
suitable. HA is maximized in segment E where both ceilings are binding. Figure 2 
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shows the budget set of a very low-income household with a deductible of zero, and 
therefore there is no segment A. 
Figure 1. Budget set with linear hedonic function when c > 0. 
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Figure 2. Budget set with linear hedonic function when c = 0 
Figure 3 depicts the segments of the budget plane projected on a space-quality plane 
when non-housing consumption is fixed. To simplify presentation, the linear hedonic 
function is used. The purpose of the figure is to illustrate how the limits on compensable 
rent divide the budget set into different segments.  
In the figure, the vertical line 11 HH ?  is the spaciousness ceiling and the upper upward 
sloping line starting from the origin is the quality ceiling. The straight downward 
sloping line represents dwellings with rent equal to the deductible. It is only possible to 
get HA for a dwelling above this line. The figure shows that, in addition to the 
deductible, there are two additional restrictions on entitlement to HA. These restrictions 
are not explicitly mentioned in the legislation, and are therefore labeled implicit 
spaciousness and quality thresholds in this paper. The vertical line bcH /1 ?  is the 
implicit spaciousness threshold. Even if the household is entitled to HA on the basis of 
rent paid, housing space must additionally exceed this lower limit. The lower upward 
sloping line is the implicit quality threshold. The implicit spaciousness and quality 
thresholds and the deductible further divide segment A into three segments A1 – A3. In 
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segment A1, the household does not receive HA because the rent they pay is lower than 
the deductible. In segment A2, rent is higher than the deductible but the household 
consumes too much quality and too little space to get HA. In segment A3, rent is higher 
than the deductible but the household consumes too little quality and too much space to 
get HA. 
Figure 3. Segments of the budget set projected on space-quality plane (linear hedonic 
function, deductible > 0)
Table 1 reports the partial derivatives of the budget constraint with respect to space and 
quality. The table is utilized below when analyzing household optimization under the 
HA scheme. The partial derivatives of the hedonic function are called hedonic prices. 
These hedonic prices are generally dependent on the levels of both space and quality. 
The arguments of the hedonic prices are suppressed in order to simplify notation. The 
marginal prices of H1 and H2 are simply their hedonic prices 
1H
R  and 
2H
R  in segment 
A, where compensable rent is lower than the deductible, and in segment E, where both 
the quality and spaciousness ceilings are binding and the household receives the 
1H
Quality ceiling
Spaciousness ceiling
B
EC
D
Rent = 
deductible
bc /
Implicit spaciousness
threshold
Implicit quality
threshold
A1
A2
A3
Quality (H2)
Space (H1)
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maximum possible subsidy. In segment B, where neither ceiling is binding, the effective 
marginal prices of H1 and H2 are (1–a)*100 per cent of the hedonic prices. In segment 
C, where only the quality ceiling is binding, the marginal price of H2 equals the hedonic 
price but the marginal price of H1 is lower than the hedonic price because renting one 
square meter more increases subsidy by the amount ab. In segment D, where only the 
spaciousness ceiling is binding, the marginal price of H1 net of subsidy is higher than 
the hedonic price if rent per square meter is higher than the hedonic price 
1H
R . The 
marginal price of quality is lower than the market price in segment D because the share 
11 / HHa of additional quality expenditure is compensated.  
Table 1. Slope of the budget plane in different segments. 
Segment A B C D E 
Compensable rent > c 
11 HH ?
bHR ?1/
no yes 
no
no
yes 
no
yes 
yes 
yes 
no
yes 
yes 
yes 
Subsidy 0 )( cRa ? )( 1 cbHa ?
???
?
???
?
? cR
H
Ha
1
1 )( 1 cHba ?
1H
subsidy)-(rent
?
?
1H
R
1
)1( HRa? abRH ?1
???
?
???
?
??
11
11
1
HH RH
R
H
HaR 1H
R
2H
subsidy)-(rent
?
?
2H
R
2
)1( HRa? 2HR
2
1
11 HRH
Ha ???
?
???
?
? 2H
R
Household optimization 
The household is assumed to maximize its utility U from housing space (H1), housing 
quality (H2), and non-housing goods (X)
(3) ),,( 21 XHHU .
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Housing space is the floor area of the dwelling and quality includes all other 
characteristics, such as the physical condition of the building, distance to city center, 
local amenities and neighborhood quality. In order to analyze the incentive structure of 
the HA scheme we consider how introducing the HA scheme affects a household which 
initially consumes an optimal bundle on the budget constraint without any allowance.
Without HA, the household maximizes its utility subject to the budget constraint 
),( 21 HHRXY ?? . The optimal consumption bundle is such that the marginal rate of 
substitution of any two goods equals their relative price. When HA is introduced, the 
budget constraint is given by equation (2). From Figure 1, it is seen that the optimal 
consumption bundle of the household may be an interior point in one of the segments or 
along the kinks, except for the kinks between segment A and the hump where the 
budget plane bends inward. The first-order conditions for an interior solution in the 
segments are that the marginal rates of substitution between space, quality, and non-
housing goods equal their relative marginal prices net of HA. Due to the non-convexity 
multiple equilibria are also possible, even if the hedonic rent function R is convex.
The effect of HA for a household initially consuming its optimal unsubsidized bundle 
when HA is introduced is analyzed in two steps. 1) The effect of price changes is 
considered, holding the utility constant at the pre-allowance level and shifting the 
budget plane until the marginal prices of space and quality correspond to their 
subsidized levels reported in Table 1. The effect of the price changes on the demand for 
one of the three goods is unambiguously positive (negative) if the relative price of that 
good relative to the two other goods decreases (increases) from its pre-HA level. 2) The 
income which gives the pre-HA utility at subsidized prices is increased until the virtual 
income on the left-hand side of (2) is reached. The first effect is termed the substitution 
effect and the latter the income effect. We assume that all three goods are normal goods, 
which means that the income effect is positive in segments B-E for all goods. If the 
substitution effect and income effect in a segment work in the same direction, we can 
deduce the direction in which the HA scheme encourages the households to move on 
their budget constraint. If the income and substitution effects have opposite signs, their 
joint effect is ambiguous unless the effects can be quantified. 
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In order to be able to derive the qualitative demand effects of changing marginal prices 
also for segment D, we now assume that the hedonic price of space is decreasing 
( 0
11
?HHR ). Under this plausible assumption, 0)/( 11 ?? HRHR  for each point in 
segment D, and hence the HA scheme increases the hedonic price of space in segment D 
(see Table 1). 
The substitution effects can now be inferred from Table 1. The substitution effect is 
positive (negative) if the price of the good relative to the two other goods decreases 
(increases). Table 2 reports the signs of income and the substitution effects and their 
joint effect in the various segments. The substitution effect for non-housing on segment 
D is ambiguous since non-housing becomes cheaper relative to space but more 
expensive relative to quality. The joint effects for space demand on segment D and 
quality demand on segment C are ambiguous since the substitution effects and income 
effects work in different directions. Which effect dominates depends on demand 
elasticities and the relative magnitudes of the income and price changes. Next we 
attempt to quantify the probable substitution and income effects by estimating a hedonic 
function and utilizing existing estimates of the price and income elasticities of rental 
housing demand. 
Table 2. Effects of HA on demand for space, quality and non-housing goods. 
Segment A B C D E 
Substitution effects      
Housing space (H1) . + + - 0 
Housing quality (H2) . + - + 0 
Non-housing (X) . - - ? 0 
Income effects      
Housing space (H1) . + + + + 
Housing quality (H2) . + + + + 
Non-housing (X) . + + + + 
Joint effects      
Housing space (H1) . + + ? + 
Housing quality (H2) . + ? + + 
Non-housing (X) . ? ? ? + 
From Table 1, it is seen that the effect of HA on the marginal price of quality within 
each segment is proportional to
2H
R . Thus it is not necessary to know 
2H
R  to quantify 
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the percentage changes in 
2H
R  due to the HA scheme. However, estimates for 
1H
R  are 
needed when evaluating percentage changes in 
1H
R  on segments C and D. As suggested 
by Mayo (1981), among others, we assume that the hedonic function takes the form 
(4) ?12 HaHR ? ,
where a is assumed to depend on a city and year-specific rent shifter ?  and a random 
error term ?  through the exponential function )exp( ?? ??a . Furthermore, we assume 
that quality depends on observed dwelling attributes Z and unobserved dwelling 
attributes ?  through the exponential function )exp(2 ??? ??? ZH . The hedonic 
function means that rent is proportional to quality but changes less than proportionately 
with housing space. Quality cannot be estimated since we cannot identify ?  and ?
separately. Nor can we separate the effect of unobserved housing attributes from the 
composite error term. However, the parameters ?  and ?  can now be estimated by 
regressing the model 
(5) )()ln()()ln( 1 ?????? ?????? HZR .
Consistent estimation by OLS requires that unobserved housing attributes and the 
random part of the composite error term are not correlated with observed attributes. A 
potential source of bias is that the data does not include distance to city center. 
Excluding the distance to center from the set of covariates will bias the estimate of ?
downwards if dwelling size is positively correlated with distance to center. Therefore, 
Eq. (5) was first estimated with data for the Helsinki Metropolitan Area (HMA). The 
data for HMA includes an indicator for location in the city of Helsinki, which is a 
suitable proxy for distance to city center, which is a major determinant of quality, as 
defined in this study. The estimate for ?  did not change when the Helsinki indicator 
was omitted, and hence we believe that the lack of proxy variables for the distance to 
center for other cities does not bias ?  estimates severely.  
The hedonic equation (5) is estimated separately for three Finnish cities (Helsinki 
Metropolitan Area, Turku and Tampere). Data for 2002 to 2005 is used (see Section 4.3 
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for description). The coefficients of dwelling attributes are assumed to stay constant 
within a city but allowed to vary between cities. The results are reported in the appendix 
(Table A3).
The results of the hedonic regression can now be used to obtain estimates for the 
hedonic price of space for individual households ( 1)exp(
1
???? ????? HZRH ). The 
hedonic price is measured with error since the effect of unobserved characteristics ?  is 
not included in the measure, but the measurement error should not be systematic if the 
unobserved attributes are not correlated with observed attributes. Approximately correct 
hedonic prices are sufficient for our purposes, since we use them only to quantify the 
impact of the HA scheme on the hedonic prices in different segments of the budget 
plane.
Table 3 shows estimates for the proportional effect of HA on hedonic prices and 
income. The figures are based on calculations for a sample of 275 eligible households 
living in Helsinki, Turku and Tampere in the years 2002 to 2005. In segment C, the HA 
scheme pivots the hedonic function so strongly that the hedonic price of space decreases 
by 95 per cent on average. Roughly three out of ten households in segment C would get 
more than 100 per cent compensation if they moved to a larger apartment, i.e. the 
effective price of space is negative for them. In segment D the effective price of space 
increases by 32 per cent on average and the price of quality decreases by 58 per cent on 
average. Mean income changes vary from 19 per cent in segment B to 25 per cent in 
segment E.  
Table 3. Effects of the HA scheme on hedonic prices and income.  
Segment A B C D E 
Price changes     
Housing space H1 0 All -0.8 Mean -0.95 Mean +0.32 0 
   Range (-1.50,-0.59) Range (+0.22,+0.48)  
Housing quality H2 0 All -0.8 0 Mean -0.58 0 
    Range (-0.79,-0.36)  
Non-housing X 0 0 0 0 0 
Income changes     
Mean 0 +0.19 +0.20 +0.23 +0.25 
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Table 3 indicates that the HA scheme causes large changes in the hedonic prices of 
space and quality. Whether these price changes ought to lead to strong changes in 
consumption patterns depends on the price elasticity of demand. In Chapter 3, we 
estimated the elasticity of overall housing consumption with respect to price and income 
to be -0.34 and 0.19 respectively. Assuming that the price elasticities of the demand for 
space and quality are both approximately -0.34 leads to the conclusion that we would 
expect households in segments B, C and D to move towards segment E. In particular, 
households in segment C have a very strong incentive to increase their space 
consumption and we would expect only a few households to find an optimum in that 
segment. Furthermore, we would expect a household initially consuming in segment A 
to find a new optimum in one of the other segments where they would get part of their 
rent compensated in the form of HA. 
Figure 4 illustrates the kind of behavior we would expect to observe from eligible 
households. The figure depicts three identical households with identical pre-allowance 
income and housing expenditure but differing tastes for space and quality. Their budget 
set is projected on the space-quality plane and the straight bold line represents the 
hedonic relationship between space and quality in the absence of HA when non-housing 
consumption is fixed. Household 1 has the highest preference for space and household 3 
has the highest preference for quality. For the sake of presentation it is assumed that HA 
does not affect non-housing expenditure. When HA is introduced we would expect all 
households to consume more similar bundles in segment E or on the kinks bordering 
segment E. 
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Figure 4. The effect of HA on space and quality choices. 
Discussion
The analysis above is simplified and assumes that all eligible households participate in 
the program, know its details, and can adjust their housing consumption continuously 
and without costs. Thus if the kind of behavior depicted in Figure 4 is not observed, the 
obvious possible explanations are the following. 1) Adjustment of housing consumption 
entails moving and households choose to stay in their current dwelling if moving and 
transaction costs are high relative to the gains attainable through moving. 2) Applying 
for HA is time-consuming and involves mental costs (stigma). 3) Households are not 
aware that they can get HA for their dwelling or they do not know or understand how 
HA is determined. 
The preceding analysis operates in the context of private rental markets, where it is 
reasonable to assume that if two dwellings in the same housing market area have 
different rents but the same size, quality is higher in the dwelling with higher rent. In the 
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social housing sector, rents are not determined by market forces, and therefore do not 
reflect differences in quality. In Finland, the main alternative to a private rental dwelling 
is social housing built with government-financed loans (ARAVA). Social housing is 
mostly owned by municipalities and allocated on social criteria. The HA system also 
covers social housing tenants. Thus tenants may receive two types of government 
subsidy at the same time. Social housing can be thought of as a take-it-or-leave-it offer 
of an individual space-quality combination at below-market price. The HA scheme may 
affect the choice between private and social rental housing by changing their relative 
price. This is an interesting question for further research. In the empirical part, social 
housing tenants are excluded from the analysis when describing space-quality choices 
but included when analyzing moving behavior and take-up propensity.
4.3 Empirical analysis  
The complexity of the Finnish HA scheme poses challenges for empirical research. 
Previous work by Venti and Wise (1984) suggests that moving costs deter many 
households from adjusting their housing consumption in response to subsidies. On the 
other hand, Koning and Ridder (1995) highlight the importance of application costs for 
modeling behavioral responses to housing subsidies. Ideally one would like to model 
space-quality choices, moving decisions, and take-up decisions simultaneously. In the 
case of the Finnish HA scheme, with the three-dimensional budget set, the simultaneous 
modeling of these three aspects of behavior would be very difficult and is left for further 
research. In this paper, we analyze space-quality choices, residential mobility and take-
up propensity separately. First, we compare the distribution of eligible and non-eligible 
households with respect to the quality ceiling and spaciousness ceiling. Second, we 
estimate a model of intra-urban mobility in order to test whether moving probability is 
affected by the incentive structure of the HA scheme. Third, we analyze factors 
affecting take-up propensity.  
Data and simulation of HA 
The data used in this study comes from the Income Distribution Survey (IDS) provided 
by Statistics Finland. The data currently covers the years 1990 to 2005 but only data 
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from 2000 to 2005 are used in this study. The annual sample sizes vary between 8000 
and 10,000 households. The sample sizes drop significantly when owner-occupiers are 
dropped and other restrictions are made. The survey design is such that the same 
households are surveyed in two consecutive years, after which they exit the sample. 
This panel property makes it possible to calculate the amount of HA in the previous 
dwelling for those who moved within the survey year. The data includes information on 
HA received in December of the survey year and during the whole year. The housing 
variables include housing tenure status, the sector of the rental unit, rent paid, floor area 
in square meters, and certain other dwelling attributes. For confidentiality reasons, 
location in the housing market area cannot be identified. 
The data was augmented with the parameters of the HA scheme. Based on the subsidy 
parameters and observable household and dwelling characteristics, we are able to 
determine the eligibility status of the household, simulate the amount of HA the 
household is entitled to in its current dwelling or in any alternative dwelling, and 
identify the segment of the budget set in which the household is located. Our own 
calculations do not reproduce perfectly the reported amounts of HA in the IDS data. 
Table 4 shows that roughly 25 per cent fewer households were reported as recipients in 
the data than the simulation model predicts. One of the reasons is that a significant 
number of households entitled to HA do not apply for it.34 On the other hand, HA 
received in December in the data may measure monthly HA for the current dwelling 
inaccurately since handling applications for HA often takes months and when the 
decision is made new applicants may receive several months’ compensation in one 
month. Also, recipients may have to pay back excess HA they received earlier.  
                                             
34 Non-take-up rates of housing subsidies are often substantial. For instance, Koning and Ridder (1997) 
report a 40 per cent non-take-up rate for the Dutch Rent Assistance program. Bargain et al. (2007) find 
that the non-take-up rate of social assistance (toimeentulotuki) in Finland is between 40 and 50 per cent. 
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Table 4. Recipient status and simulated entitlement status for renter households in 
2005.
Simulation 
IDS-data
Not entitled to 
HA
Entitled to 
HA Total
Did not receive HA in 
2005 0.60 0.12 0.73
Received HA in 2005 0.04 0.23 0.27
Total 0.64 0.36 1.00
Graph 1 below compares simulated monthly entitlement with HA receipt in December 
for households who were entitled to HA and were reported as recipients in the data. 
There is variation around the 45-degree line, but for most households the computed 
entitlement and the reported receipt are very similar. The mean computed HA and mean 
HA in the data in 2005 were almost equal (226 euro and 218 euro) for those who were 
entitled to HA based on the simulation and actually received HA in December. 
According to the official KELA statistics, the mean HA was 222 euro. We believe that 
the simulation model is sufficiently accurate for our purposes.
Graph 1.  HA receipts and computed entitlement, 2005.
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Descriptive analysis of space-quality choices 
In this section, we describe the distribution of eligible households across the segments 
of the budget plane and compare their space-quality choices with non-eligible 
households.
Table 5 shows how eligible households are distributed across the segments of the 
budget plane separately for all renters, the private rental sector, and the municipal rental 
sector. The figures are based on our calculations. About 9 per cent of eligible 
households are in segment A, where they are not entitled to HA, because they occupy a 
wrong kind of dwelling. Either their rent is lower than the deductible (segment A1) or 
their compensable rent is lower than the deductible because the spaciousness or quality 
ceiling is exceeded (segments A2 and A3). In the private rental sector, the quality 
ceiling is binding for most households. In municipal rental housing, the spaciousness 
ceiling is more often binding than in the private sector. Roughly 30 per cent of 
households consume in segment E, where HA is maximized. Many households are 
located in segments where adjusting the space-quality combination would increase HA. 
For example, almost 50 per cent of eligible private sector tenants consume in segment 
C, where moving to a larger dwelling while holding quality constant would be very 
favorable. This observation already suggests that eligible households may not react to 
the incentives regarding space-quality combinations. In order to be able to compare 
eligible households with non-eligible households, attention is now turned to households’ 
location with respect to the spaciousness and quality ceilings. Hypothetical ceiling 
values can be assigned both to eligible and non-eligible households.  
Table 5. Distribution of eligible households across segments of the budget set in 2005.
  All   Private sector Municipal rentals 
 Percent Std. Err. Percent Std. Err. Percent Std. Err. 
Compensable rent < deductible [A] 8.55 1.52 9.91 2.93 5.56 1.91
Neither ceiling binding [B] 9.49 1.74 3.52 1.71 15.51 3.44
Only quality ceiling binding [C] 37.03 2.71 49.24 4.97 25.65 3.66
Only spaciousness ceiling binding [D] 14.72 2.04 7.57 2.40 19.19 3.44
Both ceilings binding [E] 30.21 2.64 29.76 4.60 34.10 4.23
Total 100   100   100   
N 523  156  179  
Pop. Size 133232   44716   55548   
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Graph 2 shows scatter plots of the eligible (left panel) and non-eligible (right panel) 
households with respect to the spaciousness ceiling and the quality ceiling. Graphs 3 
and 4 show Kernel density estimates for the distributions of the distance to the ceilings. 
The solid lines represent eligible households and the dashed lines represent non-eligible 
households. The distance to the ceiling value is measured relative to the ceiling value in 
order to make households with different ceiling values comparable. Also, in order to 
facilitate comparability, the sample of non-eligible households is restricted to the 
household whose pre-tax income exceeds the eligibility threshold at most by 100 per 
cent. Households that were non-eligible based on the simulation model but received HA 
according to the data were dropped.  
Graphs 2–4 show that the eligible and non-eligible households are very evenly 
distributed with respect to the ceilings. The finding is not consistent with the theory. 
Based on the theory part, one would expect eligible households to be more tightly 
concentrated around the point where the spaciousness and quality ceilings are both 
binding (see Figure 4). One potential reason for the similarity of the distributions is that 
optimizing along the incentives of the HA scheme entails moving, which is costly in 
terms of money and time. If moving costs and the possible disutility of consuming a 
different bundle are high on average, many households may prefer not to adjust their 
housing consumption even if they knew they would get higher HA. Next we look at 
households who moved within the sample year in order to see if more pronounced 
differences can be found for households who have just adjusted their housing 
consumption.  
Graphs 5–7 show the distribution of recent movers with respect to the quality and 
spaciousness ceilings. The distributions are again very similar, but now eligible 
households are slightly more concentrated close to the quality ceiling than non-eligible 
households. Table 6 below Graphs 2–7 gives the sample means and standard deviations 
for the distributions. Only private sector tenants are included in the samples used in 
Graphs 2-7 and in Table 6. 
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Graph 2. Distribution of eligible and non-eligible households with respect to 
spaciousness ceiling and quality ceiling (private rental sector, pooled data 2000–2005) 
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Graph 3. Distribution of eligible and non-eligible households with respect to quality 
ceiling (private rental sector, pooled data 2000–2005) 
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Graph 4. Distribution of eligible and non-eligible households with respect to 
spaciousness ceiling (private rental sector, pooled data 2000–2005) 
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Graph 5. Distribution of eligible and non-eligible households with respect to 
spaciousness ceiling and quality ceiling (recent movers, private rental sector, pooled 
data 2000–2005) 
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Graph 6. Distribution of eligible and non-eligible households with respect to quality 
ceiling (recent movers, private rental sector, pooled data 2000–2005) 
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Graph 7. Distribution of eligible and non-eligible households with respect to 
spaciousness ceiling (recent movers, private rental sector, pooled data 2000–2005)
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Table 6 provides some further evidence that the incentives regarding space-quality 
combinations do not affect the housing choices of eligible households to a great extent. 
The relative distances to the ceilings and additional measures of disequilibrium in HA 
are reported for eligible households (upper panel) and non-eligible households (lower 
panel). The ratio of actual compensable rent to maximal compensable rent and the 
difference between maximal and actual compensable rent measure the distance to the 
space-quality bundles that maximize HA. Both for eligible and non-eligible households, 
recent movers are slightly closer to subsidy-maximizing quality-space choices than all 
households. Eligible movers do not seem to make larger gains in compensable rent than 
non-eligible movers. Moreover, the difference between maximal and actual HA is only 
10 euro smaller for eligible recent movers than for all eligible households. 
Table 6. Descriptive statistics. 
Eligible households All (Obs. 1506) Recent movers (Obs. 487) 
 Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Relative distance to quality ceiling 0.195 0.347 0.295 0.348
Relative distance to spaciousness ceiling 0.077 0.484 0.027 0.396
Compensable rent/max. compensable 
rent 0.689 0.148 0.713 0.137
Max. compensable rent - compensable 
rent 138.1 84.2 124.3 75.1
HA/max. HA 0.527 0.279 0.554 0.276
Max. HA – HA 106.0 64.6 95.5 56.8
Non-eligible households All (Obs. 1478) Recent movers (Obs. 430) 
 Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Relative distance to quality ceiling 0.223 0.378 0.300 0.363
Relative distance to spaciousness ceiling 0.085 0.397 0.070 0.392
Compensable rent/max. compensable 
rent 0.701 0.150 0.721 0.146
Max. compensable rent - compensable 
rent 135.5 85.7 122.5 76.1
The analysis above suggests that eligible households do not differ significantly from the 
non-eligible households in their space-quality choices. Eligible households do not tend 
to concentrate in housing units with space-quality combinations that give them high 
HA. Next we analyze the impact of HA on moving probability.  
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HA and intra-urban mobility 
Section 4.2 showed that, compared with the situation without HA, the HA system 
creates incentives to move towards segment E of the budget plane, where HA is 
maximized. Housing consumption can be adjusted only through moving. Therefore, we 
look at the moving behavior of renter households in order to test whether moving 
propensity is affected by the moving incentive induced by the HA scheme. 
Households in the data are observed in two consecutive years (Year1 and Year2). The 
data also includes information on whether the household has moved within the year. We 
study the probability that the household moved during Year2 and use Year1 information 
to construct the explanatory variables. The housing attributes included in the data refer 
to the dwelling at the end of the year. Due to the panel property, we know the 
characteristics of the previous dwelling of those who moved during Year2.  
The household moves between the end of Year1 and the end of Year2 if the utility 
attainable through moving from the current dwelling to an alternative dwelling exceeds 
the moving costs (V(Alternative dwelling) – V(Current dwelling) > Moving costs). 
Without knowledge of the utility functions, the disequilibrium between the current 
consumption bundle and the preferred bundle cannot be measured explicitly as in Venti 
and Wise (1984), for instance. We estimate a reduced intra-urban mobility model where 
the aim is to estimate the effect of a potential gain in HA when the other determinants of 
mobility are controlled for. We draw mostly on Bartik et al (1992), who model mobility 
through changes in factors affecting housing demand and factors that are thought to 
affect either monetary or psychological moving costs. We express the probability that 
the household moves between the end of Year1 and the end of Year2 as a linear index 
of control variables X and the difference between HA in the best alternative dwelling 
and HA in the current dwelling 
(6)  Pr(Move) = Pr{Xa + b*[S(Alternative dwelling) - S(Current dwelling)] + e > 0}. 
Vector X includes changes in housing demand determinants between the end of Year1 
and the end of Year2 and variables that are thought to affect moving costs. Housing 
allowance is denoted by S. The random term e is assumed to be normally distributed 
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with a zero mean. Multiplying both sides with a scalar so that e becomes N(0,1) 
distributed gives rise to a Probit model for intra-urban mobility 
(7)  Prob(move) = Prob{u < Xa + g*[S(Alternative dwelling) – S(Current dwelling)]}, 
where u is a N(0,1) distributed random variable. Bartik et al (1992) estimate the model 
with the Maximum Score method, but they do not find significant differences between 
MSCORE and Probit estimates. We report only Probit estimates. 
In order to test whether moving is motivated by potential gains in HA, we consider a 
case where the alternative dwelling is such that HA is maximized.35 For non-eligible 
households, the difference is zero even if their consumption is far from the space-quality 
combination that would maximize HA if they were eligible for HA. Therefore we use 
data for eligible households only. The gap between maximal HA and actual HA in 
Year2 before the possible move is calculated using Year1 dwelling characteristics and 
Year2 subsidy parameters. 
Table 7 reports the results. The data is pooled for the years 2000 to 2005. The sample 
includes eligible renter households living in one of the 13 major cities which can be 
identified in the data. Households that moved to another city between the two years 
were excluded since inter-urban mobility is very likely to be motivated by things other 
than housing consumption. The marginal effects are evaluated at the point where all 
explanatory variables take their mean values. The descriptive statistics are reported in 
the appendix (Table A4). The explanatory variable of interest is the difference between 
maximal HA and actual HA. Contrary to what one would expect, the coefficient is 
negative. It is hard to find an explanation for this counterintuitive result. One 
conceivable explanation could be so-called tenure discounts. Long-term tenants 
typically pay lower rents for similar dwellings than shorter-term tenants since contract 
rents are usually fixed or tied to the cost of living index, which has risen more slowly 
than the overall rent level. Tenure discounts lead to lower mobility since moving is 
associated with an increase in rent given dwelling characteristics. Tenure discounts may 
                                             
35 Loikkanen (1982) estimates a Logit model of the effect of HA on intra-urban mobility. The model is 
based on the assumption that all HA recipients have their optimum at the point where both the 
spaciousness limit and the rent/square meter limit are just met.  
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contribute to the counterintuitive coefficient for (Max HA – Actual HA) since rent 
given space and quality is negatively correlated with the gap between maximal and 
actual HA. Nevertheless, we interpret the result as evidence that many eligible 
households do not take HA into account when choosing whether to move.  
The control variables in the mobility model are the relative change in disposable income 
(without HA) and the change in household size from the previous year. Following e.g. 
Kan (1999), we allow for different effects for increases and decreases in income and 
household size. These controls are thought to capture possible changes in housing 
demand not stemming from the HA system. A decrease in income or household size 
seems to have a stronger effect on moving probability than an increase. Household size 
change is the most important determinant of moving probability. A one-member 
decrease (increase) in household size increases moving probability by 13 percentage 
points (7 percentage points). The level of household size and the age of the household 
head are included in the model because moving costs are likely to depend on these 
variables. Both household size and the age of the household head have negative effects 
as expected. The model also includes a group of year indicators (six years) and a group 
of indicators for different cities (13 cities). An indicator for private rental dwelling at 
the beginning of the year is also included in the model. Tenants in the private rental 
sector at the beginning of the year are more likely to move than tenants in the social 
housing sector. Following Ioannides and Kan (1996), previous-period housing 
consumption is included in the model in order to control for the possibility that moving 
costs are proportional to housing expenditure. 
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Table 7. Probit estimates: intra-urban mobility.
Probit estimates Marginal effects 
 Coef Std.Err dPr(move)/dx Std.Err 
(Max HA – Actual HA)/1000 -3.253 1.067 -0.748 0.240 
Household size increase 0.278 0.154 0.064 0.035 
Household size decrease 0.574 0.139 0.132 0.033 
Relative income increase -0.001 0.136 0.000 0.031 
Relative income decrease 0.504 0.396 0.116 0.091 
Household size 0.081 0.069 0.019 0.016 
Age of household head -0.021 0.005 -0.005 0.001 
Private rental sector (1/0) 0.278 0.135 0.068 0.034 
Rent in Year1/1000 -0.394 0.482 -0.091 0.110 
City dummies yes    
Year dummies yes    
R2 (Ben-Akiva and Lerman)* 0.76    
N 760       
*Mean of [Pr(move|move)+(1-Pr(move|not move)] 
Since the variables related to moving costs were controlled for, the result that potential 
gains in HA do not trigger moves can be interpreted as evidence of incomplete 
knowledge about the HA scheme. However, it is questionable whether we identify the 
causal effect of the potential gain in HA on moving decisions. There are potential 
sample selection and endogeneity issues.  
Table 8 shows the descriptive statistics of the distance to the spaciousness and quality 
ceilings and the disequilibrium in HA for recent movers, excluding those who moved 
from one city to another. The main difference between eligible (upper panel) and non-
eligible movers (lower panel) is that after moving eligible movers consume much closer 
to the spaciousness ceiling than before moving, whereas the mean distance to the 
spaciousness ceiling does not change for non-eligible households. The upper panel 
shows that eligible recent movers are on average 40 euro closer to the maximal HA after 
moving than before moving and their compensable rent is 45 euro closer to the 
maximum. However, the mean difference between maximal and actual HA is almost 
100 euro for recent movers too. Moreover, from the lower panel it is seen that non-
eligible recent movers make similar gains in compensable rent as eligible households. 
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Table 8. Disequilibrium in HA for recent movers. 
Eligible households (Obs. 133) Before move After move 
 Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Relative distance to quality ceiling 0.151 0.485 0.143 0.331 
Relative distance to spaciousness ceiling 0.119 0.576 0.013 0.318 
Compensable rent/max. compensable 
rent 0.683 0.198 0.742 0.164 
Max. compensable rent - compensable 
rent 173.5 134.4 128.8 93.5 
HA/max. HA 0.415 0.573 0.594 0.280 
Max. HA – HA 138.8 107.5 97.7 67.1 
Non-eligible households (Obs. 173) Before move After move 
 Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Relative distance to quality ceiling 0.196 0.427 0.236 0.425 
Relative distance to spaciousness ceiling 0.126 0.619 0.113 0.407 
Compensable rent/max. compensable 
rent 0.695 0.178 0.761 0.160 
Max. compensable rent - compensable 
rent 151.7 102.8 117.4 96.6 
Take-up of HA 
A potential reason why the HA system does not seem to induce eligible households to 
move to dwellings with higher HA is the incomplete take-up of HA. Households 
entitled to HA may not claim for it if they think that it is too time-consuming and 
mentally stressful or they may not know that they are entitled to HA. The overall take-
up rate of HA and factors affecting take-up are also of interest since policymakers may 
be concerned about the welfare of those who do not claim benefits they are entitled to.  
We define the take-up rate as the ratio of HA-recipient households to those who are 
entitled to HA. By entitlement we mean that the household would receive HA if they 
claimed for it. Thus eligible households consuming in segment A of the budget plane 
are classified as non-entitled. Estimating the take-up rate of HA is challenging since our 
calculations of entitlement and HA receipts recorded in the data may be inaccurate.36
When estimating the overall take-up rate, we recognize that individual households may 
be falsely classified in the data and in our calculations, but we assume that our 
                                             
36 Duclos (1995) models take-up in a framework where both the analyst and the benefit agency make 
errors in assessing entitlement. Jäntti (2007) discusses measurement error issues in take-up analysis using 
the Finnish HA scheme as an example. 
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calculations yield approximately correct estimates for the number of entitled households 
and the number of recipients in the data is approximately correct. An estimate for the 
take-up rate is obtained as the ratio of the number of recipients in the data to the number 
of those entitled based on our calculations.  Using Table 4 on page 108, we get an 
overall take-up rate equal to 0.78 (0.28/0.36 = 0.78) for the year 2005. An alternative 
estimate is obtained by assuming that our calculations of entitlement are correct and that 
recipient status is correctly recorded in the data for those entitled. Under these 
assumptions, the take-up rate is 0.64 (0.23/0.36 = 0.64). Blundell et al. (1988) use the 
latter method and obtain a take-up rate of 0.6 for UK housing benefit.
Next, we study factors affecting the probability of take-up of HA. We estimate a Probit 
model of take-up probability for a sample of households entitled to HA based on our 
simulation model. Computed HA entitlement and socio-economic variables are used as 
explanatory variables. Blundell et al (1988) argue that HA entitlement is likely to be 
endogenous in the model because of measurement error. In our application, too, there 
are inaccuracies in the data and in our simulation model. Furthermore, a household’s 
decision as to whether to claim HA is based on the expected entitlement, which may 
differ from the actual entitlement. Blundell et al (1988) use the instrumental variable 
approach described by Smith and Blundell (1986) to test for the endogeneity of 
simulated HA. They use housing expenditure as the additional instrument for simulated 
HA entitlement. Endogeneity is rejected. We argue that the test is not valid since 
housing choices and the take-up decision may be interdependent (see Koning and 
Ridder, 1997). Alas, no better instruments were found in this study and we are unable to 
test for the exogeneity of entitlement. We report only standard Probit estimates. 
The Probit results are reported in Table 9. Standard errors are clustered by household. 
The descriptive statistics are given in the appendix (Table A5). HA entitlement is 
positive and significant. An increase of 100 euro in HA increases the take-up probability 
by 10 percentage points. The result suggests that the application costs are high. 
Households with low entitlement are less likely to take up since what they would 
receive is not sufficient to compensate the costs of claiming. The estimate may be 
affected by the correlation of entitlement with the probability of false classification of 
non-entitled households as entitled. Nevertheless, the positive effect of entitlement 
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suggests that making the HA scheme more generous may have unexpectedly large 
effects on outlays since the take-up rate could increase. Age has a negative sign, which 
may be related to stigma effects. Household size is positive since household size is 
associated with more needs (given income). Income is negative as expected. The 
indicator for low education is assigned a value of one if the household head is not 
educated beyond the nine-year comprehensive school. Low education decreases the 
take-up probability by 9 percentage points. Education may be related to awareness of 
the HA system and ability to claim for HA. Expectations regarding the economic 
situation in the coming year are included in the model as a proxy for the length of time 
for which the household expects to receive HA if they decide to claim for it. An 
expected significant improvement decreases take-up probability by 11 percentage 
points. Take-up probability is 13 percentage points higher in social rental housing 
owned by municipalities, which may also reflect the effect of the expected length of the 
HA spell. Tenants in municipal rental housing typically have lower long-term income 
than free market tenants since access to municipal rental housing is means-tested. 
Indicators for recent mover status are thought to control for the false categorization of 
households that have applied for HA but have not yet received it. As expected, the 
estimated take-up probability is lower for more recent movers. Year effects are 
controlled for by including a group of year indicators (1999 – 2005).
The results for take-up propensity are in line with the results of Blundell et al (1988) 
except for the effect of education, which is positive here and negative in their study.  
The main difference between the covariates used here and in their study is that we are 
able to study the effect of income expectations. Furthermore, we control for recent 
mover status. 
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Table 9. Probit estimates: HA take-up propensity. 
Probit estimates Marginal effects 
 Coef Std.Err 
dPr(take-
up)/dx Std.Err
HA entitlement (EUR 100, monthly) 0.231 0.026 0.091 0.010
Age -0.012 0.002 -0.005 0.001
DisposabIe income (pre-HA, EUR 100, monthly) -0.094 0.007 -0.037 0.003
Household size 0.167 0.034 0.066 0.013
Low education -0.243 0.075 -0.096 0.030
Expects economic situation to improve 
somewhat -0.009 0.054 -0.004 0.021
Expects economic situation to improve 
significantly -0.296 0.106 -0.118 0.042
Municipality rental housing 0.377 0.051 0.147 0.020
Moved within 5 months -0.404 0.070 -0.160 0.027
Moved within 6 to 11 months -0.099 0.077 -0.039 0.031
Year dummies yes    
R2 (Ben-Akiva and Lerman)* 0.61    
N 3621       
* Mean of [Pr(take-up|take-up)+(1-Pr(take-up|non-take-up)] 
4.4 Conclusions
In this study, we characterize the incentive structure of the Finnish housing allowance 
system in a three-commodity (housing space, housing quality and non-housing) 
framework. It is shown that the HA scheme creates incentives to consume certain space-
quality combinations. The empirical results suggest that many households eligible for 
HA do not optimize their space and quality combinations in accordance with the 
incentive structure of the system. Eligible households’ space-quality choices are not 
consistent with the optimizing behavior predicted in the theory part. According to the 
results of the intra-urban mobility model, mobility is not positively affected by the HA 
scheme. The results suggest that many households are unaware of the details of the 
complex HA system and are unable to optimize in accordance with the incentive 
structure of the system. Additional evidence is provided by Lauronen (1987), who 
interviewed HA recipient families and found that their knowledge of how moving to a 
larger dwelling would affect their HA benefit was very limited. Furthermore, costs 
related to applying for HA and ignorance about eligibility may also explain why eligible 
households do not respond to HA incentives. We find, for example, that low education 
level decreases take-up probability.  
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Based on the analysis above it is not easy to assess whether the HA system works as 
intended. On the one hand, the results are not conclusive since the empirical analysis is 
based mostly on descriptive graphs and there are potential endogeneity issues in the 
mobility model and in the take-up model. On the other hand, the objective of the system 
is not well defined. The stated objective of the system is to secure a decent standard of 
housing also for those on low incomes and to ensure that they can afford a sufficient 
level of other consumption. It can be argued that the implicit objective of the system is 
to induce eligible households to consume bundles that maximize the subsidy. The 
findings indicate that the HA system does not succeed in that objective particularly well.
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Appendix
Table A1. Upper limits to acceptable floor area. 
Household 
size 
Spaciousness 
ceiling m2
1 37 
2 57 
3 77 
4 90 
5 105 
6 115 
7 125 
8 135 
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Table A2. Upper limits to acceptable rent/m2 in the city of Helsinki in 2005 (euro/m2)
Year of construction or major 
renovation 
Floor area 
m2 -1985 1986-95 1996-
-25.9 11.5 12.3 12.8
26-30.9 10.6 11.5 12.0
31-35.9 9.8 10.6 11.1
36-45.9 9.0 10.1 10.6
46-60.9 8.6 9.8 10.3
61-80.9 8.3 9.4 9.9
81- 8.2 9.3 9.8
Table A3. Hedonic regression results (Dep. Var. Ln(Rent)). 
Helsinki Area Tampere   Turku 
 Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Ln(floor area) 0.621 0.027 0.516 0.055 0.670 0.041
Age of the house -0.007 0.001 -0.008 0.003 -0.005 0.002
Age of the house sqr. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
D(Helsinki centre) 0.169 0.029     
D(apartment block) -0.002 0.050 0.173 0.071 0.025 0.070
D(material rock or brick) 0.331 0.058 0.110 0.091 0.297 0.085
D(year 2003) 0.048 0.033 0.063 0.056 0.107 0.047
D(year 2004) 0.031 0.033 0.167 0.059 0.143 0.048
D(year 2005) 0.053 0.034 0.093 0.055 0.177 0.049
Constant 3.576 0.131 3.949 0.249 3.121 0.178
N 668  136  158.000  
R-squared 0.50   0.50   0.715   
Table A4. Descriptive statistics, mobility model. 
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Mover indicator 0.175 0.380 0 1 
(Max HA - Actual HA) 115.6 79.1 0 684.5 
Household size increase 0.104 0.385 0 5 
Household size decrease 0.128 0.565 0 7 
Relative income increase 0.190 0.468 0 5.451 
Relative income decrease 0.099 0.174 0 0.942 
Household size 2.5 1.5 1 8 
Age of household head 39.7 12.0 17 64 
Private rental sector (1/0) 0.307 0.461 0 1 
Rent in Year1 (monthly) 474.7 187.0 15 1116 
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Table A5. Descriptive statistics, take-up propensity model. 
  Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Take-up indicator 0.552 0.497 0 1
HA entitlement (euro/month, simulated) 203.0 123.8 17.3 891.5
Rent (euro/month) 445.9 175.9 24.0 2018.0
Age 38.8 12.7 16 64
Disposable income (pre-HA, euro/month) 1258.8 705.4 0.1 5950.0
Household size 2.41 1.49 1 8
Low education 0.173 0.378 0 1
Expects economic situation to improve 0.271 0.444 0 1
Expects economic situation to improve 
significantly 0.054 0.227 0 1
Municipality rental housing 0.410 0.492 0 1
Moved within 5 months 0.147 0.354 0 1
Moved within 6 to 11 months 0.107 0.309 0 1
VATT-TUTKIMUKSIA -SARJASSA ILMESTYNEITÄ 
PUBLISHED VATT RESEARCH REPORTS 
 
101. Kangasharju Aki: Maksaako asumistuen saaja muita korkeampaa vuokraa? Helsinki 
2003. 
102. Honkatukia Juha – Forsström Juha – Tamminen Eero: Energiaverotuksen asema EU:n 
laajuisen päästökaupan yhteydessä. Loppuraportti. Helsinki 2003. 
103. Simai Mihály (ed.): Practical Guide for Active National Policy Makers – what 
Science and Technology Policy Can and Cannot Do? Helsinki 2003. 
104. Luoma Arto – Luoto Jani – Siivonen Erkki: Growth, Institutions and Productivity: An 
empirical analysis using the Bayesian approach. Helsinki 2003. 
105. Montén Seppo – Tuomala Juha: Muuttoliike, työssäkäynti ja työvoimavarat 
Uudellamaalla. Helsinki 2003. 
106. Venetoklis Takis: An Evaluation of Wage Subsidy Programs to SMEs Utilising 
Propensity Score Matching. Helsinki 2004. 
107. Räisänen Heikki: Työvoiman hankinta julkisessa työnvälityksessä. Helsinki 2004. 
108. Romppanen Antti: Vakaus- ja kasvusopimuksen ensimmäiset vuodet. Helsinki 2004. 
109. Vaittinen Risto: Trade Policies and Integration – Evaluations with CGE Models. 
Helsinki 2004. 
110. Hjerppe Reino – Kiander Jaakko (eds.): Technology Policy and Knowledge-Based 
Growth in small Countries. Helsinki 2004. 
111. Sinko Pekka: Essays on Labour Taxation and Unemployment Insurance. Helsinki 
2004. 
112. Kiander Jaakko – Martikainen Minna – Voipio Iikko: Yrittäjyyden tila 2002-2004. 
Helsinki 2004. 
113. Kilponen Juha – Santavirta Torsten: Competition and Innovation – Microeconomic 
Evidence Using Finnish Data. Helsinki 2004. 
114. Kiander Jaakko – Venetoklis Takis: Spending Preferences of Public Sector Officials. 
Survey Evidence from the Finnish Central Government. Helsinki 2004. 
115. Hämäläinen Kari – Ollikainen Virve: Differential Effects of Active Labour Market 
Programmes in the Early Stages of Young People’s Unemployment. Helsinki 2004. 
116. Räisänen Heikki: Recent Labour Market Developments in Europe. Helsinki 2005. 
117. Ropponen Olli: Kokonaiskulutuksen kehitys Suomessa talouden ulkopuolisten 
tekijöiden suhteen vuosina 1985–2001. Helsinki 2005. 
118. Räty Tarmo – Luoma Kalevi – Aaltonen Juho – Järviö Maija-Liisa: Productivity and 
Its Drivers in Finnish Primary Care 1988–2003. Helsinki 2005. 
119. Kangasharju Aki – Aaltonen Juho: Kunnallisen päivähoidon yksikkökustannukset: 
Miksi kunnat ovat niin erilaisia? Helsinki 2006. 
120. Perrels Adriaan – Ahlqvist Kirsti – Heiskanen Eva – Lahti Pekka: Kestävän 
kulutuksen mahdollisuudet ekotehokkaassa elinympäristössä. Helsinki 2006. 
121. Berghäll Elina – Junka Teuvo – Kiander Jaakko: T&K, tuottavuus ja taloudellinen 
kasvu. Helsinki 2006. 
122. Rauhanen Timo – Peltoniemi Ari: Elintarvikkeiden ja ruokapalveluiden 
arvonlisäverotus EU:ssa ja Suomessa. Helsinki 2006. 
123. Kiander Jaakko – Martikainen Minna – Pihkala Timo – Voipio Iikko: Yritysten 
toimintaympäristö: Kyselytutkimuksen tuloksia vuosilta 2002–2005. Helsinki 2006. 
124. Räty Tarmo – Kivistö Jussi: Mitattavissa oleva tuottavuus Suomen yliopistoissa. 
Helsinki 2006. 
125. Teppala Tiina: Kulutusverotus teoriasta käytäntöön – Vaikuttaako arvonlisäverotus 
kuluttajahintoihin? Helsinki 2006. 
126. Ulvinen Hanna: Suomen elintarvike- ja ruokapalvelualan rakenne, kilpailullisuus ja 
taloudellinen suorituskyky. Helsinki 2006. 
127. Aaltonen Juho – Kirjavainen Tanja – Moisio Antti: Efficiency and Productivity in 
Finnish Comprehensive Schooling 1998–2004. Helsinki 2006. 
128. Mattila-Wiro Päivi: Changes in the Distribution of Economic Wellbeing in Finland. 
Helsinki 2006. 
129. Kiander Jaakko: Julkisen talouden liikkumavara vuoteen 2030 mennessä. Helsinki 
2007. 
130. Lintunen Jussi: Tuloerojen ja taloudellisen eriarvoisuuden mittaamisesta: Sovellus 
Suomen kulutustutkimuksilla. Helsinki 2007. 
131. Kirjavainen Tanja: Nuorten lukiokoulutuksen tehokkuus 2000–2004. Helsinki 2007. 
132. Ollikainen Virve: Ammatillisen peruskoulutuksen kustannustehokkuus 2001–2003. 
Helsinki 2007. 
133. Kyyrä Tomi: Studies on Wage Differentials and Labour Market Transitions. Helsinki 
2007. 
134. Mannermaa Kauko: Ohjailusta kilpailuun – Suomen hallitusten kasvu- ja 
rakennepolitiikka vuosina 1962–1999. Helsinki 2007. 
135. Aaltonen Juho – Kirjavainen Tanja – Moisio Antti – Ollikainen Virve: 
Perusopetuksen, lukioiden ja ammatillisen peruskoulutuksen tuottavuus ja tehokkuus 
– Loppuraportti. Helsinki 2007. 
136. Parkkinen Pekka: Väestön ikääntymisen vaikutukset kuntatalouteen. Helsinki 2007. 
137. Räty Tarmo – Aaltonen Juho – Kirjavainen Tanja: Tuloksellisuuden ja tuottavuuden 
mittaus ammattikorkeakouluissa. Helsinki 2008. 
138. Räty Tarmo – Harava Maiju: Kokonaistuottavuuden kehitys yliopistoissa. Helsinki 
2008. 
 
